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Abstract 
The central ideas in this work are health as a moral entitlement and equity in health. It is a discourse 
on distributive justice in health and takes Uganda as a case study. It describes Uganda health system 
especially the extent and distribution of health-related injustice brought about by severe poverty and 
the manner health resources are raised and allocated. This manner disproportionately adversely affects 
the poor’s access to health services and endangers their livelihoods due to catastrophic health 
expenditure. This work further critically reviews the theory of utilitarianism (QALYS) which is 
popularly used in the allocation of scarce health resources. Utilitarianism is accepted as good for 
ensuring efficiency in health resource allocation, but not good enough to ensure equity in health. This 
being the case a discussion of other ethical principles of health resource allocation that attempt to close 
the 'fairness gap' left by the theory of utilitarianism becomes necessary. Having critically examined 
QALYs and other moral principles, it emerges that a discourse on these per se is good but not good 
enough to guarantee equity in health in Uganda, even if a harmony between these suggestions were 
found. The main reason for this is that the said discourse is based on a subtle, yet wrong assumption, 
that all health services in Uganda are financed by the state and therefore health equity would be 
achieved if those resources are equitably distributed. This assumption ignores the fact that due to 
severe poverty and a very steep social gradient, out-of-pocket payment for health services is a 
prohibitive factor in the use of private health services. This leads to unequal access to health services 
between social classes since 50% of health out-put is from the private health service providers, hence 
must be paid for. This points to the fact that there is a strong spiral cause relationship between poverty 
and health inequity, the fact that is ignored in the discourse on QALYs and other allocation principles 
that aim at health equity. Therefore, since the poor are disproportionately adversely affected in the 
current system, developing an equitable financing mechanism for the health care system which takes 
into consideration the special needs of the poor should be a key priority in Uganda. 
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Abstrakt 
Den sentrale ideer i dette arbeidet er helse som en moralsk rett og egenkapital i helse. Det er en diskurs 
om rettferdig fordeling i helse og tar Uganda som en casestudie. Den beskriver Uganda helsevesenet 
spesielt omfanget og distribusjon av helse-relaterte urettferdigheten skapt av alvorlig fattigdom, og 
den måte helseressurser er hevet og fordeles. Denne måten uforholdsmessig negativt påvirker de 
fattiges tilgang til helsetjenester og truer livsgrunnlaget på grunn av katastrofale helseutgifter. Dette 
arbeidet videre vurderinger kritisk teorien om utilitarisme (QALYs) som er populært brukt i 
fordelingen av knappe helseressurser. Utilitarisme er akseptert som bra for å sikre effektivitet i helse 
ressursfordeling, men ikke gode nok til å sikre egenkapitalen i helse. Dette blir tilfelle en diskusjon av 
andre etiske prinsipper for helse ressursfordeling som prøver å lukke 'fairness gapet "til venstre ved 
teorien om utilitarisme blir nødvendig. Å ha kritisk undersøkt QALYs og andre moralske prinsipper, 
framgår det at en diskurs på disse i seg selv er bra men ikke god nok til å garantere egenkapitalen i 
helse i Uganda, selv om en harmoni mellom disse forslagene ble funnet. Hovedårsaken til dette er at 
nevnte diskursen er basert på en subtil, men likevel feil forutsetning, at alle helsetjenester i Uganda er 
finansiert av staten, og dermed helse egenkapital ville oppnås dersom disse ressursene blir rettferdig 
fordelt. Denne antakelsen overser det faktum at på grunn av alvorlig fattigdom og en veldig bratt 
sosial gradient, ut-av-lomme betaling for helsetjenester er en uoverkommelige faktor i bruk av private 
helsetjenester. Dette fører til ulik tilgang til helsetjenester mellom sosiale klasser siden 50% av helse-
utgang er fra det private helsevesenet tilbydere, dermed må betales for. Dette peker på det faktum at 
det er en sterk spiral årsak sammenhengen mellom fattigdom og helse urettferdighet, det faktum som 
er oversett i diskursen om QALYs og andre tildeling prinsipper som tar sikte på helse egenkapital. 
Derfor er fordi de fattige uforholdsmessig negativt påvirket i dagens system, utvikle en rettferdig 
finansiering mekanisme for helsevesenet som tar hensyn til de spesielle behovene til de fattige bør 
være en prioritet i Uganda. 
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Introduction 
This work is a discourse on distributive justice/equity in health and it takes Uganda as the 
case study. The underlying concept of this work is health as a moral entitlement to which all 
human beings are equally entitled by virtue of their moral equality. Hence, any deprivation to 
this entitlement is a moral evil and much less if it is unequally distributed among the citizens. 
The conception of health as a moral entitlement is drawn from Aristotle’s conception of the 
citizen’s moral entitlement to conditions that enhance human capabilities.1 In Nicomachean 
ethics, Aristotle argues that the state (law-giver or ruler) has a moral duty to ensure that the 
citizens can afford a good and flourishing life or to be able to function properly; and his 
search for the good is a search for the highest good. Although this highest good (desirable for 
its own sake - a virtuous life) is not health, Aristotle makes it clear that on top of striving to 
live a virtuous life, in order to be happy one must possess other goods as well - such as good 
health among others. And one's happiness is endangered if one is severely deprived in such 
advantages - for example, one has lost children or good friends through death (Aristotle, 
(1099a31-b6)). The reason for the pursuit of these contingent human goods other than a 
virtuous life is that one's virtuous activity will be to some extent diminished or defective, if 
one lacks an adequate supply of other goods (Aristotle (1153b17-19)). Someone who is in a 
very poor health state, (un educated, without friends) et cetera, will simply not be able to find 
many opportunities for virtuous activity over a long period of time, and what little he can 
accomplish will not be of great merit. Hence,  drawing on Aristotle’s argument that the 
citizens possess moral entitlements to those things that enhance their proper functioning, and 
health care being one of them, it follows, on Aristotle’s account that, health care is a moral 
                                                 
1
 Drawing on Aristotle and Marx, Nussbaum claims that for a person to be able to live a life worthy of the 
dignity of the human being entails that she possesses certain capabilities that represent various kinds and 
amounts of activity and opportunity. These central human capabilities each ‘above’ a specified threshold all-
inclusively constitute a level of substantive freedom to pursue one’s own ends in such a way that is 
commensurate with the dignity of the human being. (Nussbaum, 2006). 
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entitlement. 2  Hence, although health is not to be conceived as an ultimate good or be 
conceived to have an intrinsic value, human beings have a moral entitlement to that which 
makes their virtuous life possible. For this reason, severe deprivation of health is seen as 
unjust and worse still if this deprivation is inequitably shared among those that suffer it. 
 
Regarding the distributive conception of these enabling conditions for a good and flourishing 
life, Aristotle argues that “It is evident that the best politeia is that arrangement according to 
which anyone whatsoever might do best and live a flourishing life” (Nussbaum 1987:2).  For 
that matter therefore, “It is the job of the excellent law-giver to consider, concerning a city 
and a class of human beings and every other association, how they will partake in the 
flourishing living that is possible for them”(Nussbaum 1987:2).  Equally, it has been argued 
that within democracies citizens should be able to participate in decision making about issues 
which affect their vital interests. Access to appropriate health care is clearly one of the most 
important of such interests. On the face of it, therefore, if justice in health is to be realised, the 
way in which scarce health care resources are distributed between those who need them is an 
obvious candidate for a democratic mandate. It is for this reason that in attempting to come to 
grips with the moral problems posed by the necessity for health care rationing, governments 
of different countries have endorsed the importance of public participation in setting priorities 
in health care spending (Cooper, Coote 1995:1). 
 
In the history of political philosophy, from the ancient times to the present, a number of 
theories of distributive justice have been formulated and discussed. However, in this work I 
have no intention of discussing or listing all of them. This work considers at length, one of 
                                                 
2
 This argument has been further extrapolated and developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in their 
capabilities approach to health care entitlements. It has further been a basis of a human rights approach to health 
and a basis by the World Bank and the World Health Organisation to demand that all countries should define 
certain amount of health care called the Minimum Health care package. This minimum health care is expected to 
enough to enable basic human functionings. 
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these ethical theories that has been widely debated in health care discourse regarding health 
resource allocation. The theory considered in this case is utilitarianism. Further, theories such 
as and egalitarianism and prioritarianism are also briefly reflected upon with the intention of 
filling the ‘fairness gap’ left by the theory of utilitarianism in health resource allocation. 
Those who advance other theories apart from utilitarianism, such as egalitarianism, 
prioritarianism among others, argue in favour of equal chances of being healthy or ill. On the 
converse, those who endorse utilitarianism in health argue that health policy should be 
designed to maximise health benefits from a given budget, no matter how fairly of unfairly 
those benefits are distributed among the people.  
 
This discourse is founded on the normative position that, the way health policy is designed 
particularly regarding priority setting amidst scarce resources and endless health needs, 
should lead to equitable distribution of health benefits and burdens. This position has been 
motivated by the general agreement that health services throughout the world do not have 
enough resources to meet the health care needs of all of their citizens. Therefore, some form 
of rationing within health services is inevitable (Ham, Janovsky 1996:25-41). Even within 
health care systems in which access to health care is guaranteed - however they are funded-
this will mean that some who are ill will not necessarily receive treatment when they need it, 
if at all. Hence, the moral quality of health care delivered in such circumstances of scarcity 
will depend on the fairness and justice with which such decisions are made (Doyal 1998:98-
102). 
  
The scarcity of health resources is more severe for developing countries like Uganda, and this 
has compounded the severity of deprivation to health entitlements. It is this scarcity of 
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resources that makes health systems decide to go utilitarian with the aim of achieving the 
maximum health benefits possible with the available resources.  
 
The process of priority setting has had a number of ethical controversies that call for critical 
reflection. The controversies are between those who endorse utilitarianism to the effect that 
no matter what, health systems must strive to maximise health benefits from a given budget. 
Hence, the advocates of this position advance what they call ‘Quality Adjusted Life Years’ 
(QALY) approach, which is based on utilitarian principles, as the only appropriate tool for 
health policy analysis since it ensures efficiency. On the other hand, those who are more bent 
to principles of justice argue that equity in health is as important as efficiency. Hence, not 
only the amount of health benefits matters but also how fairy these benefits are distributed. 
But still, those who believe that equity is a very important aim of health service delivery have 
advanced conflicting ethical principles they think would lead to equity in health. As a solution 
to these competing ethical principles of allocation, a set of principles has been suggested in 
what has been called the Complete Lives System which combines a number of these principles. 
Further, the complete lives system has not passed without challenges. And moving away from 
the controversial substantive ethical principles, another suggestion has been given aiming at 
equity in health. This suggestion is the ‘Fair Procedures’ approach in what is now popularly 
known as Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R). This has itself proved circular in a sense 
that such a project would be impossible without making reference to the substantive ethical 
principles which it purports to bypass. 
 
The discussion in this work is taking place with reflections on Uganda’s health system 
especially the extent of health deprivation and how unjustly this burden is distributed. The 
problem of health-related injustice in Uganda is compounded by the extent of poverty which 
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implies severe scarcity of health resources. As noted above, scarcity of health resources is an 
obvious and glaring challenge world-wide – even within the high income countries like 
Norway.   Hence, whereas other countries like Norway are reckoned to be under-deprived in 
terms of health and the social determinants of health, there also is said to be scarcity of health 
resources. This gives a clear picture of how severely deprived a low income country like 
Uganda is in terms of health.   For instance, in the case of Uganda, the gross national income 
per capita (PPP international $) is 880 against 50,070 for Norway; Life expectancy at birth 
m/f (years) stands at 49/51 for Uganda against Norway’s 78/83; Healthy life expectancy at 
birth m/f (years, 2003) is 42/44 for Uganda while that of Norway stands at 70/74. Further still, 
in Uganda, the probability of dying under five (per 1 000 live births) is 134 and that of 
Norway is 4; and that of dying between 15 and 60 years m/f (per 1 000 population) is 518/474 
for Uganda against Norway’s 86/53. For the case of Uganda, total expenditure on health per 
capita (Intl $, 2006) is at 143 compared to 4521 for Norway (WHO, 2008). 
 
For that matter, therefore, in this work I will partly endeavour to show in some detail, the 
extent of Uganda’s health deprivation and its unequal distribution due to experiences of 
extreme poverty and income distribution which is extremely unequal. I will do this because it 
is important to note that due to the fact that Uganda’s health sector is severely underfunded, 
50% of health services are financed out-of-pocket by households; and for this reason it has 
been found out that that on average, 9% of households incomes are spent on health services 
which means that, given the level income disparities in the economy the poor must be 
spending about 30% of their income on health. And as a consequence of this, nearly 5% of the 
households in Uganda are experiencing catastrophic payments while 2.3% are impoverished because 
of medical bills (Government of Uganda, MoH 2010). 
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Generally, in chapter one of this thesis I argue that Uganda is severely deprived of health 
entitlement due to the severe underfunding of the health system. I will also argue that the 
injustice in the Uganda health care system is further compounded by inequitable distribution 
of this deprivation due to the system’s financing mechanisms which are inequitable and 
fragmented, and that there are not yet systematic efforts to avoid this injustice. In chapter two 
where I discuss the moral relevance of utilitarianism in health resource allocation, my analysis 
reveals that in the face of severe deprivation like one in Uganda as elsewhere in the 
developing world, there is nothing inherently wrong with endorsing the theory of 
utilitarianism with its consequent ‘health-benefit-maximisation’ as a guiding principle in the 
allocation of health resources. I indicate that this theory can however be treated with 
suspicion if it ignores concerns of distributive justice in health.  After this I go ahead to show 
how utilitarianism and its consequent QALY maximisation indeed ignore issues of 
distributive justice, hence needing supplementation and mitigation from other ethical 
principles. I chapter three I present a critical discussion of these other ethical principles and 
further argue that, of these ethical principles suggested for allocation of health resources, still 
none of them on its own takes care of all ethical values that need to be considered for the sake 
of balancing equity and efficiency. I also discuss the suggestion made by Persad et al: that is, 
a combination of a number of morally relevant principles in what they call the Complete Lives 
System. I also consider Norman Daniel’s proposal of the Fair Procedures approach and its 
challenges. In the conclusion (chapter four) I indicate that, even though it is worth the effort 
to try to come up with approaches and ethical principles for the allocation of the available 
public resources, this is not enough to guarantee health equity in Uganda. The reason given is 
that the discourse on these approaches and ethical principles miss the fundamental cause of 
health inequities in low income countries which is poverty and its impact on access to health, 
given the financing mechanisms of health services in these countries. I conclude that since 
 21 
utilitarian-based QALY approach and all ethical principles ignore the fundamental cause of 
health inequities in Uganda which is poverty and the financing mechanisms of the system, 
developing an equitable financing of the health care system which takes into account the 
needs of the poor should therefore be a key priority. 
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Chapter 1 
The Uganda Health Care System: An Overview 
The Extent and Distribution of Health Deprivation 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will present an overview of Uganda’s health care system as a basis of 
analysing the relevance of the major ethical theory, utilitarianism and its consequent QALY 
approach regarding health resource allocation. In this chapter, three main arguments are 
presented: The first argument is that Uganda is severely deprived of health-related 
entitlements and this is because the health sector is severely underfunded. I show that as a 
consequence of underfunding, there is a lot out-of-pocket payment for health services by the 
public in order to cover the deficit, and this has negative implications for equity. I will do this 
by providing figures that indicate the level of deprivation such as budget allocations to the 
health sector and the deficits therein. For this purpose I will also indicate how much the 
individuals are affected by catastrophic health expenses due to lack of essential drugs in 
public health facilities. I argue that the ultimate outcome of this arrangement, the whole 
system has evidently disproportionately negatively affected the poor’s access to health 
services and has endangered the poor household’s livelihoods and this is further compounding 
the health injustice in Uganda. 
 
The second point of this chapter is an attempt to show that health entitlement deprivation in 
Uganda is inequitably distributed. I will argue that this is because of the fact that Uganda 
health care financing system is inequitable and fragmented and it disproportionately adversely 
affects the poor. I will do this by exploring the health care financing mechanisms in Uganda 
and how equitable they are. To make this point clear, I will first show briefly the meaning and 
demands of equitable financing so that after presenting Uganda’s financing mechanisms it 
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will be easy to tell whether and how much inequitable the burden of financing health care is 
inequitably distributed.   
 
The third argument is that even though attempts are made in the health policy statements 
about prioritisation in an attempt to equitably share this deprivation, there is still lack of 
systematic effort to health care rationing. I will make this point by examining real priority 
setting practices in the health sector to find out how systematic this process is. I will indicate 
the scope of the priorities in the Uganda health care and argue that since everything about 
health care in Uganda is include in priorities, then the system lacks in systematicity regarding 
priority setting. I will further show that as a consequence of this, the stated values such as 
priority to the poor, women and children and equity in general are seriously compromised. 
Before tackling the above-mentioned three points, for purposes of clearly understanding the 
health care system in Uganda, I will first highlight a brief background of Uganda’s health 
sector and its general structure. 
 
Background 
The background to Uganda’s health care system given here is a brief historical context of the 
Uganda health system since independence (1962), and the current health status of Uganda. It 
also highlights the structure of the system; that is, the organisation and ownership (how much 
of the system is public or private).  
 
Historical context 
According to the findings by Arudo and Syngellakis in their Overview on Uganda’s Health 
Care System since Independence (1962), Uganda had the best performing sector in the region 
up to the 1970s. “In the years after independence in 1962-1971 Uganda had the best health 
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indices and the best health care system in the sub-region” (Syngellakis, Arudo 2006). This is 
attributed to the clear prioritisation and efficient management of the sector during that period. 
However, after 1971 “Health care service provision was highly fragmented and opportunistic” 
(Syngellakis, Arudo 2006). As far as prioritisation was concerned, it is noted that before 1971 
communicable disease control programmes and research programmes were top on the agenda 
and were very active, with funding from multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors and research 
organisations in more developed countries (Syngellakis, Arudo 2006). 
 
Moving from the 1970s and 1980s to the present, the analysis of Uganda’s priority in the 
health sector indicates that the government’s attention has been primarily focussed on re-
establishing a political and economic environment conducive to growth, not improving the 
health of Ugandans as such. In other words, the health sector in general has not been of 
priority. The social sector ministries have been less of a priority, with no attention given to 
developing comprehensive health policy for the country (Syngellakis, Arudo 2006). This 
partly explains the extent of severity of health-entitlement deprivation in Uganda. It is further 
shown that health care service delivery has been a key element of many aid programmes, 
though this is not mirrored by the development of national health policy, which has remained 
ad hoc and focused on hospital rehabilitation (Syngellakis, Arudo 2006). However, 
irrespective of commitment to improve people’s health (in political rhetoric), Uganda’s health 
indicators are very poor, judging from those indicators that are outlined as areas of priority – 
sexual and reproductive health, child health, health education, and control and prevention of 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis.  
 
Current health status 
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Information on the current health status in Uganda is crucial to the process of setting priorities 
in the health sector. Such information include the leading cause and distribution of morbidity 
and mortality in different age groups, sexes, social status, location – that is neighborhood such 
as rural against urban populations or slum dwellers against rich-suburb-dwellers. The reason 
here is that, if a health policy is to be effective, efficient and fair in a way it sets priorities for 
alleviating health deprivation, it must take into considerations all this data.    
 
According to the World Health Organisation’s findings on the leading causes of morbidity 
and mortality in Uganda, HIV/AIDS is the leading cause, accounting for 25% of all deaths. 
This affects all age groups. This is followed by malaria, causing 11% of deaths, followed by 
lower respiratory infections at 11% also, and diarrheal diseases at 8%. The rest of the causes 
are not so significant and are all below 5%. They include, poor perinatal conditions, 
tuberculosis which is now more as a result of HIV, cerebral vascular disease, ischaemic 
disease, measles, and tetanus, respectively (WHO 2006). 
 
According to Uganda’s available literature on health care, priority is set out in two aspects. 
One is in terms of the guiding moral principles and values that will guide the implementation 
of the health policy, and second is in terms of what type of health interventions will receive 
the highest portion of the budget and attention in general. On the part of priorities for guiding 
values and principles, they include ensuring equity in health, priority to the poor, women and 
children and ensuring accountability – both financial and non-financial. From these moral 
principles and values, there is derived what health interventions are to receive the highest 
portion of the budget and attention in general. There are four priority interventions which 
include sexual and reproductive health, child health, health education and promotion and 
control and prevention of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. This is what is referred to as 
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the Primary Health care (PHC) for Uganda.  Since all these priority interventions need a well 
functioning health system, and realising that Uganda’s health system is not that type at 
present, a fifth area of priority has been added. “For the above to be achieved the government 
commits itself to strengthening the health system; hence priority is also given to systems 
strengthening” (Government of Uganda, Ministry of Health, 2008:43). However, the general 
statement of strengthening the health system among top priorities makes virtually everything 
about health becoming a priority. This is most likely to make implementation of such a policy 
extremely difficult. 
 
The structure of the system  
According to Uganda’s Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) III, the National Health System 
(NHS) in Uganda constitutes of all institutions, structures and actors whose actions have the 
primary purpose of achieving and sustaining good health. It is made up of the public and the 
private sectors. The public sector includes all government health facilities under the Ministry 
of Health (MoH), health services of the Ministries of Defence (army), Internal Affairs (Police 
and Prisons) and Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). The private health delivery system 
consists of Private Health Providers (PHPs), Private Not for Profit (PNFPs) providers and the 
Traditional and Complementary Medicine Practitioners (TCMPs) (Government of Uganda, 
MoH, 2009). 
 
 The Uganda Ministry of Health is the overseer of the whole health care system in Uganda. 
However, even though this is the case, since Uganda adopted a Sector Wide Approach for 
health care, other ministries have some kinds of responsibilities to fulfil in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Health (Government of Uganda, MoH, 2009). 
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As an overall monitor of the system, one among the core functions of Uganda’s national 
health care system is the stewardship of the sector including policy appraisal and 
development, oversight of health sector activities, assuring quality, health equity and fairness 
in contribution towards the cost of health care, harnessing the contribution of other related 
sectors, ensuring that the sector is responsive to the expectations of the population (trust) and 
to be accountable for the performance of the wider health sector. (Government of Uganda, 
MoH  2008:54)  
 
Goals, Aims and objectives of the health system 
According to the Uganda National Health Policy of May 2009, the slogan for the health sector 
is “Reducing poverty through promoting people’s Health” (Government of Uganda, MoH , 
2009:8). Its vision is to have “a healthy productive population that contributes to economic 
growth and national development” (Government of Uganda, MoH, 2009:8). On the social 
values to guide the health care delivery, the policy further re-affirms the people’s right to the 
highest attainable level of health – “the constitution guarantees rights of access for all people 
in Uganda to high quality health care services (Government of Uganda, MoH 2009:8). 
Constitutionally, the government of Uganda has an obligation to provide basic medical 
services to its people and promote proper nutrition. Among its primary objectives is that “The 
State shall take all practical measures to ensure the provision of basic medical services to the 
population (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995: xx). Other social values to 
consider include solidarity, equity, respect of cultures and traditions of the people of Uganda, 
integrity and ethics, patients’ responsibilities and accountability. 
 
Objectives 
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According to the National Health Policy, no general objective(s) are stated for the health 
policy, other than the goal, mission and vision of the system. Instead, each area of concern has 
its own objective. For the minimum health care package, for instance, the objective is “To 
ensure the provision and increase the utilisation of a Uganda National Minimum Health Care 
Package (UNMHCP), consisting of promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services 
for all priority diseases and conditions, to all people in Uganda with emphasis on vulnerable 
populations” (Government of Uganda, MoH ,2009:13). For the organisation and management 
of the system, the objective is “To strengthen the organisation and management of MoH and 
district health systems and ensure effective harmony and linkage among the different levels of 
health care, private and public sectors, and MoH and the autonomous and self-accounting 
national institutions” (Government of Uganda, MoH, 2009). Most importantly, regarding the 
financing of the health system, the objective is “To mobilise sufficient financial resources to 
fund the health sector programmes whilst ensuring equity, efficiency, transparency and 
accountability in resource allocation and utilisation” (Government of Uganda, MoH , 
2009:20), among other health system concerns with their specific objectives. 
 
Value-based Objectives 
Health systems generally have various value-based aims and objectives. In the case of Uganda, 
other than the objectives relating to what needs to be achieved, the Uganda health care system 
recognises two Value-based objectives in health care service delivery. According to the 
Uganda National Health Policy and other related literature, equity in health is taken as one of 
the most crucial aims of the system. A lot of efforts have been promised to ensure equity in 
health. Some of the efforts towards achieving this objective are seen in the attempt to ensure 
universal and free access to the UNMHCP, though this still awaits realisation.  At the same 
time, equity is not the only major aim of Uganda’s health system. It competes with another 
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widely accepted aim – efficiency. Efficiency has so far been more pronounced in Uganda’s 
health care than equity, according to most Annual Health Sector Performance Reports 
(Government of Uganda, MoH, 2007). Not limited to the Ugandan health system alone, 
generally it is never easy to decide which of these two aims is more important than the other. 
Hence the most successful health system is normally said to be the one that keeps these two 
aims in balance.  
 
Health care Financing: The Extent of Deprivation 
Introduction 
So far I have given highlights of the context of Uganda’s health system in a historical and 
present context as well as the basic structure and arrangement of the system. So, in this first 
main point of this chapter, I will show the extent to which Uganda is deprived of health 
entitlement. I will do this by examining the financing status of the health system: that is, the 
amount of financial resources available to the sector and the resulting deficits. Of course, the 
existence of budgetary deficits imply that the people will not have access to the basic health 
care that is deemed enough to facilitate their normal functioning; and this is a moral evil since 
they are morally entitled to this basic health care. The reason for approaching this point by 
being concerned about the financing status of the health system is the fact that there is a 
strong relationship between how much resources are available to a health system and access 
to health services. I will discuss this point in detail in the next point, immediately after this.  
 
The existing inequities in health in Uganda according to previous studies, (Orem, Zikusooka  
2010:23) are majorly caused by the manner health care is financed, and also in the 
deficiencies within the allocation principles. But mainly, these inequities are attributed to the 
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financing mechanism that the system relies on which involves a lot payment for health care 
services out-of-pocket.  
 
Health Financing and Management 
The way a health system is organised and managed in terms of ownership (private or Public), 
has a lot of implications on how health as a whole is financed. At an ideal level, it is expected 
that all that part of the health sector that is under state ownership (public) is free for all 
citizens. On the other hand, all that part that lies under private ownership is financed by the 
clients from out-of-pocket. In turn, all this has an impact on health equity – that is, whether all 
social classes have fair and equal chances of accessing health care services whenever they 
need them. This is the case because the easiness with which the public can access health 
services, more especially in a severely poverty-stricken country like Uganda, is a function of 
how much they depend on the public and private sectors for those services. For that matter 
therefore, in the case of poverty-stricken societies, all things considered, the higher the 
dependence on the private sector, the more difficulty in accessing health services, and vice 
versa. 
 
With the above in mind, it is imperative to note that Uganda’s health sector ownership is by 
both the public and the private sectors, and the health out put for both sectors is shared in the 
ratio of 1:1. According to the Uganda National Health Sector Strategic Plan III, it is shown 
that up to the Financial Year (FY) 2008/2009, the public health expenditure as a proportion of 
government’s discretionary expenditure has been relatively stable at around 9.8%, below the 
Abuja Declaration target of 15%. Note is also taken that there is no user fees charged in 
public hospitals but health insurance is for a few and largely subsidized by the employers on 
behalf of employees. Households constitute a major financing source of the National Health 
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expenditure (NHE), at 49.7%, followed by donors at 34.9%, central government at 14.9% and 
then the international NGOs at 0.4% (Government of Uganda, MoH, 2010).  
 
The Government of Uganda recognizes its failure to fulfil its moral obligation of providing 
the planned minimum health care package to its citizens due inadequacies in financing. As 
indicated in the Health Policy statement of May 2009, “adequate quantities of affordable, 
good quality essential medicine and health supplies should be accessible to all who need them. 
However, this is not always the case. Inadequate financial and human resources, capital 
investments and management issues have resulted in the public sector being unable to fulfil its 
mandate of providing medicines to all those who need them” (Government of Uganda, MoH, 
2009:6). The consequence of this shortfall in health care financing by the public sector is that 
there is a lot of reliance on out-of-pocket financing of the health services by the population. 
Even though there is no payment of user fees in the public health centres, “the shortages 
therein have increased dependency on the private sector” (Government of Uganda MoH 2010). 
The general picture of how households are affected by financing their health is that: 
 
Households spend about 9% of their expenditure on health, although no user fees are 
paid in lower level government health units and general wings of publicly owned 
hospitals. However, the private sector charges user fees. When medicines are not 
available in the public sector, patients buy from the private sector. As private health 
insurance, largely subsidized by employers on behalf of employees is for a few, health 
expenditure remains high for most households. It is also known that while public 
health services are largely free many patients pay under-the counter fees in public 
institutions. Nearly 5% of the households in Uganda are experiencing catastrophic 
payments while 2.3% are impoverished because of medical bills (Government of 
Uganda MoH, 2010). 
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The HSSP III shows that, the private sector plays an important role in the delivery of health 
services in Uganda, covering about 50% of the reported output. As noted earlier, the private 
sector generally comprises of the Private Not for Profit Organisations (PNFPs), Private Health 
Practitioners (PHPs) and the Traditional and Complementary Medicine Practitioners 
(TCMPs), the contribution of each sub-sector to the overall health output varies widely. The 
PNFP sector is more structured and prominently present in rural areas. The PHP is fast 
growing and most facilities are concentrated in urban areas. TCMPs are present in both rural 
and urban areas, even if the services provided are not consistent and vary from traditional 
practices in rural areas to imported alternative medicines, mostly in urban areas. The 
Government of Uganda recognizes the importance of the private sector by subsidizing the 
PNFP and a few private hospitals and PNFP training institutions.  
 
In all this arrangement, however, the important point to note is that all private health services 
are financed out-of-pocket, and they account for 50% of the total health out put for the sector. 
In fact, it could be said to account for much more than this. The reason is that more often, the 
government attributes some of the out put to itself even if it is from out-of-pocket of the 
patients: take for instance, when pregnant mothers are asked to buy their own gloves, razor 
blades, birth sheets et cetera, when they go to government health facilities. Other cases 
include when a patient is admitted in a government health facility and they have to buy from 
pharmacies the most expensive drugs prescribed for them. In all these cases as long as the 
patient goes to the public health facility, the government claims all the out put. It is very 
likely that the percentage of health sector output that can be legitimately attribute to 
government is about 30% or less. This is be corroborated by the government’s revelation that: 
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There is inadequate funding to provide the UNMHCP in all facilities as envisaged: the 
per capita cost was estimated at USD 41.2 in 2008/09 and will be rising to USD 47.9 
in 2011/12 (or UGX 2.75 billion) yet the health budget according to the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was estimated at USD 12.5 per capita in 2008/09, 
demonstrating a shortfall of almost USD 29. This trend has important implications for 
service delivery during the HSSP III period as it will imply the need for further 
priority setting, based on the UNMHCP (Government of Uganda MoH, 2010:23-24). 
 
Indeed, if from the above revelation we calculate the percentage of government’s contribution 
to the estimated $41.2 per capita expenditure on health, it will be discovered that the $12.5 
which was government’s contribution to $41.2 per capita for the Financial Year 2008/2009, is 
only 30.33%. This means that, the households who are the financiers of the private health care 
sector pay about 70% of the health out put. 
 
It should be remembered that one of the main objectives of the Uganda Government through 
the Ministry of Health is that the Government of Uganda is committed to improve the health 
status of its people through formulation of sound health financing policies that can create 
significant fiscal space in the health sector in the medium term. Even though the Government 
of Uganda subsidizes the PNFPs and its training institutions and a few private hospitals, the 
level of subsidies for PNFPs remains low at 20% and rather intermittent. The allocation to 
PNFP facilities is disproportionately low with the volume of services delivered, and takes 
little account of changing needs in terms of workload. According to the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan III, “in order to effectively sustain financing to the health sector, there is a need 
for improving allocative and operational efficiency, increasing government contribution to the 
health sector budget and mobilizing community contributions through implementation of the 
national health insurance scheme” (Government of Uganda MoH, 2010). 
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Deficits for health services 
The purpose of presenting the deficits in the health budget is to show the extent to which 
Uganda is deprived even of the minimum health care to which all people, by virtue of their 
equal moral status, have an equal moral claim. By indicating the severity of health-entitlement 
deprivation in Uganda I intend to paint a clear picture of how much injustice Ugandan 
citizens are suffering generally. 
 
Generally, when it comes to the amount of resources allocated to the health sector, the health 
sector is severely underfunded. It has been reported, for instance, that for the financial year 
2010/2011 the health budget had been cut from Shs 743.1 billion (USD 313.5million) in 
2009/10 budget to Shs 638.3 billion (USD 296.3million). This has further reduced the 
percentage from 9.8% of the total budget in 2009/2010 financial to 9.7% of the total budget 
for the financial year 2010/2011. All this is contrary to the African Union Abuja Declaration, 
which stipulates that governments should allocate at least 15 per cent of their national budgets 
towards health (WHO, 2000:17). Faced with this severe underfunding, the Health Minister 
unveiled a tight spending plan highlighting essential drugs that constitute the minimum health 
care package among the unfunded priorities. In a policy statement to parliament, Dr Mallinga 
reported that although the ministry is expected to spend Shs 201.7 billion (USD 85.1 million) 
on medicines and medical supplies; this financial year, for instance, there is a shortage of 
Shs6.7b (USD 2.8 Million) for essential drugs. Other shortages he cited include Shs4 billion 
(USD1.6Million) for the Cancer Institute, Shs6 billion (USD 2.5 Million) for medical 
equipment, Shs1.2b for rehabilitation of 41 hospitals and Shs8.4 billion (USD 3.5 Million) for 
water and electricity in hospitals (Mallinga  2010). 
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The policy statement revealed that out of Shs 201.7 billion, Shs140 billion is for HIV/Aids 
and malaria treatment. These required funds will be needed to buy 250,000 blood bags, 
facilitate 180 heart operations and recruit 800 health workers with an additional Shs155.5b 
USD 65.6 Million) deficit for payment of medical workers. Another Shs 7 billion USD 3 
Million) will be required for the prevention, control and mitigation of epidemics and other 
public health emergencies in the country. In spite of supplementary funding of Shs 90 billion 
from the Global Fund to fight HIV/Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, a deficit of more than 
Shs100 billion remains in the health budget this year (Mallinga 2010). Further, under the 
unfunded priorities, Dr Mallinga has reported that the budget for cancer (Shs 4.1 billion) 
covers only six per cent of the required amount. Shs 30 billion is needed for infrastructure 
expansion, Shs 10 billion for research and Shs 6 billion for cancer services to spread all over 
the country. From the health of ministry’s report, it is already evident that critical shortage of 
essential drugs in the country will put thousands of lives of Ugandans at risk. The 
consequence of this will be either to finance this deficit through out-of-pocket by the 
households for those who can afford private health services, or go without the health services 
needed and yet not funded for the poor. 
 
In Uganda today, “there is a raging debate for increased public spending on health beyond the 
current $8 per capita, which is only one-third of what is needed to provide the minimum 
health care package” (Odaga Lochoro 2006:1). In contrast, however, it has been observed that 
in Uganda, strict limitations on public spending and sectoral budget seem to be there to stay, 
given the current political climate. The country’s prime interest is economic growth and to be 
free from interference from external donors in its planning and budget execution processes. 
Moreover, planners at the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (the 
main powerful advisers to the political leadership), the report adds, are not convinced about 
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the significance of the health sector in economic development. Accordingly, there is no hope 
for things to get any better or to lead to significantly more resources to health. Consequently, 
the health sector has systematic shortages and failures, with almost every intervention and 
process affected (Odaga Lochoro 2006:1). 
 
Is Health Deprivation Equitably Shared? 
Introduction 
In the above point I have laboured to show that Uganda suffers severe health-related injustice 
due to the severe scarcity of health resources. But as I hinted earlier, even though it is an 
injustice that a society is deprived of health entitlements, there can also be another level of 
injustice within that society. It is for this reason that I make the following point about whether 
and how much this deprivation is fairly distributed among the people. But in order to 
authoritatively say that the deprivation is equitably or inequitably shared, there is a need to 
have a generally recognised benchmark upon which to make this judgement. It should be 
noted again that the source of injustice in health in Uganda has been found to be the 
mechanisms the system relies on for financing. Hence, I will present briefly what it means to 
say that a health system is equitably financed, and from this it will be easy to see whether and 
to what extent the burden of health deprivation is equitably shared in Uganda.  
 
According to all Annual Health Sector Performance Reports, the most cited challenge for 
Uganda’s health care sector is inadequate funding. In the case of Uganda this is the major 
source of inequity in health since it limits access to health services especially for the poor. As 
said above, the mechanisms of financing health care – say, how much the government pays, 
how much is paid out-of-pocket, and whether there is universal health care insurance – have 
serious ramifications for or against equity. The overall comment that can be made about 
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Uganda in terms of equity in financing health care is an allegation that, considering the 
demands of equitable financing of health, Uganda’s mechanisms of financing are inequitable 
(Orem, Zikusooka  2010:26). This is the point I want to prove below. 
 
Meaning of Equitable Financing 
Equitable financing of health care means that those with comparatively least resources make 
the least contribution to the health financing not only in absolute terms, but also as a 
proportion of their resources. It further means that lack of personal resources does not restrict 
somebody’s receipt of health services that are recommended based on prevailing norms and 
scientific knowledge (Braveman, Gruskin 2003:542).  Viewed as such, therefore, equitable 
financing would increase access to health care for the poor and the near-poor. According to 
Braveman and Gruskin, equitable financing of health care could also reduce the prevalence 
and depth of poverty by protecting those who are most vulnerable from impoverishment 
resulting from health care expenses. This would eventually break the vicious cycle of poverty 
and ill-health from lack of access to health care, which in turn would reduce inequities in 
health in the long run.  Equitable financing, therefore, is likely to be sustainable only if 
resources are pooled for those members of society who are healthy and those less healthy, and 
for the affluent and the poor (Braveman, Gruskin 2003:542). 
 
Equitable financing is said to be based on financial protection, progressive financing and 
cross-subsidies (Orem, Zikusooka , 2010:25). Financial protection means that no one in need 
of health services should be denied access due to inability to pay, and households’ livelihoods 
should not be threatened by the costs of health care. Progressive financing on the other hand, 
demands that contributions to health care funds should be made in accordance with the 
ability-to-pay, so that those with greater ability to pay should contribute a higher proportion 
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of their income than those with lower incomes. Cross-subsidies mean that there ought to be 
flow of resources from the healthy to the ill and from the rich to the poor. Hence, an equitable 
financing mechanism is one that enhances cross-subsidisation in a sense that it allows for a 
greater proportion of the population to be covered and has progressive contributions (Orem, 
Zikusooka  2010:25). 
 
Further, for there to be equity in a health system, one of the conditions is that people with the 
same health needs receive the same health care. Justice in health care demands that patients, 
rich and poor, feel the same incidence of the burden of financing health care. For this to be 
possible, as noted above, the richer patients would be expected to pay a comparatively higher 
percentage of their incomes in order to subsidise the poor patients, and the healthy should also 
contribute to the health expenses of those who are ill. This progressive and cross-subsidisation 
in financing would only be possible if, and only if, all health care, or at least the biggest 
percentage of it, is under public ownership and is being funded by the government. In a 
deprived society, it is only under this arrangement that one can say that there is equitable 
sharing of the burden of health deprivation. 
 
Financing mechanisms and implication for equity 
In consideration of what it takes for a system to be said to be equitably financed as shown 
above, investigation by Orem and Zikussoka about health care financing in Uganda has 
concluded that “Overall, Uganda’s current health financing is inequitable and fragmented” 
(Orem, Zikusooka  2010:26). The heavy reliance on out-of-pocket funding and the absence of 
integrated financing mechanisms in Uganda’s health system result in very poor fund pooling. 
This poor fund pooling means that among patients of the same health needs, some will receive 
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care while others will not; and others will receive better health care than the rest. This is 
inequitable sharing of the burden of trying to alleviate health deprivation. 
 
It is very important to take note that attempts have been made to ensure free and universal 
access to the minimum health care in Uganda. In 2001, the Uganda government scraped user 
fees for health services in all government health facilities. But despite the fact that health 
services are meant to be free for all, the poor quality of services, lack of appropriate 
medicines in health facilities (Orem, Zikusooka 2010:25) and poor physical access to 
facilities continue to result in reliance on formal and informal private health care providers 
(Uganda Bureau of statistics, 2006). Reliance on private health care providers means that the 
only mechanism available to finance this care is direct out-of-pocket payment for these 
services. 
 
As it has been noted earlier, 50 percent of the total health expenditure in Uganda is still met 
by the households (out-of-pocket); this percentage of the total health expenditure is equivalent, 
on average, to 9% of the expenditure of all households (Government of Uganda, MoH, 
2010:23). And given the wide income inequalities in Uganda, with GINI coefficient that 
equals 45.7 (UNDP, 2009), it means that it is even worse for the poor households and it has 
been estimated to be at 70% for the last quartile of the population (Orem, Zikusooka 2010). 
As a consequence of this inequitable financing mechanism, it has been found out that in 
Uganda nearly 5 percent of households are experiencing catastrophic payments for health 
services, while 2.3 percent are impoverished because of medical bills. 
 
Further, in a situation like Uganda’s where over 50% of the health sector is financed from 
out-of-pocket, equity remains evidently very difficult to achieve. This is because two patients 
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of same health need but from different income levels will pay the same amount for health care 
from the private provider. This is unfair to the poor patients because they are paying a much 
higher percentage of their income than the rich – the poor feel the biggest incidence of the 
burden of financing health services. Hence, this reveals that one way in which inequity in 
health is exhibited in Uganda and which also doubles as the cause of other forms of inequity 
is the mechanism of how health care is financed.  
 
Yet in another instance, in extreme cases the poor patients fail to pay for treatment and in this 
case they will not access it or will access less than the rich patients can afford, even if they 
have exactly the same health needs. This is a compromise of the horizontal equity.  A related 
phenomenon is also true between the populations of urban and rural areas. Even if both of the 
rural and urban patients were to fully rely on public health care, it would mean that the rural 
patients will pay more in transport to access health care since a significant number of them 
(52%) are living farther than five kilometres from the health facilities. In real terms then, they 
would have paid more in comparison with their urban dweller counterparts. And further, in 
situations where you find that distance has become a prohibitive factor in the use of health 
care services, it would mean, as is the case in some parts of Uganda, there will have been 
inequity in access to health care due to long distances.  
 
Hence, from the above analysis it can be concluded that other than the general health-
entitlement deprivation that Uganda suffers at a societal level, there is yet another deeper level 
of health injustice in Uganda. This injustice consists in the inequitable distribution of this 
deprivation and since this deprivation is related to the health financing mechanisms, then it is 
more against the poor. Therefore, for there to be justice within the health system in Uganda, 
attention needs to be paid to the financing mechanism such that they are protective of the poor. 
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Priority setting in health 
So far I have made two out of the three main points meant for this chapter. In the first place I 
have shown that Uganda is severely deprived of health entitlements due to the underfunding 
of the health sector, and this is a moral evil. In the second place I have shown that this 
deprivation is inequitably distributed due to inequitable financing mechanisms used in the 
sector, and this compounds the depth of health injustice within Uganda. Having made these 
two points, my third point which follows below is intended to critically examine Uganda’s 
efforts to equitably distribute this deprivation. This equitable distribution, if tenable, would at 
least ensure health justice at a domestic level, since justice in this case is about equitable 
sharing of the burdens and benefits of the system. The attempt to equitably distribute health 
entitlement deprivation is normally through a process priority setting in allocation of the 
available scarce health resources. Here, on top of exploring actual priority practices, 
particularly which health interventions are of priority, I will first indicate the ethical principles 
are said to guide allocation of health resources, and then later state whether they are reflected 
in health out comes. 
 
Ethical principles 
According to the Uganda National Health Policy (2009), the ethical principles that are 
supposed to guide health service delivery are equity and efficiency. The strategy to achieve 
equity is to be pro-poor and being gender sensitive in favour of women, and being responsive 
to age by giving priority to the young ones. Geographically, no distinction is made between 
the rural lot and the desperate slum dwellers on one hand, and the rich urban dwellers on the 
other.  
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It is important to note that Uganda, like any other sub-Saharan African country, is a low-
income country. The health care-related implication of this economic status is that the country 
has stringent choices to make on how to spend the available limited resources to meet the 
extremely high health care needs of its population. Hence, due to extreme scarcity of health 
resources, priorities are mainly set with a view of achieving the highest health results possible 
using the available resources; that is, to have a cost effective health care system. Yet, as noted 
earlier, over-concentration on efficiency has led to the relegation of concerns of distributive 
justice. Since both of these aims are so crucial for any health system, then it is clear that 
health care system in Uganda faces one of the most complicated priority setting process. 
Further it will be noted that because of over whelming urgent health needs of Uganda, it has 
not been easy at all to come out with clear and consistent priorities. As a result there are no 
systematic efforts to priority setting as seen in clear contradictions in priority statement in the 
national health policy and what obtains on the ground. 
 
What complicates the priority setting process in Uganda as opposed to what may obtain in a 
relatively higher income country like Norway, is the fact that the resources available for 
Uganda are not even enough to assure all individuals of the minimum health care, since a lot 
of priority areas are reported to be underfunded (Mallinga 2010). This is shown to be true 
from the ministry’s own evaluation which reported that “Over all, only 26% of sampled 
health units had continuous availability of the ‘indicator medicines’3 during the month in 
which the evaluation was carried out (Republic of Uganda, MoH 2010). This is what makes 
the business of priority setting in Uganda’s health care system even more complex and 
complicated since it would require revision of priorities which means that new priorities from 
the already existing priorities must be set. 
                                                 
3
 These medicines include “coartem Yellow, salfadoxine pyrimethamine tab, contrimaxole 480mg tab, Oral 
Rehydration salt Sachet, medroxyprogesterone injection (“Depo”) 
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However, although distinction is made in favour of the poor, the young and women in 
principle, in practice there is no specific arrangement to achieve this. For instance, maternal 
mortality rate is still at 550 out of 100,000 live births, under-five mortality rate is still as high 
as 134; (Busingye 2011). While regarding children’s health ranking world-wide, Uganda 
holds the 21st last slot out of 189 countries (UNICEF 2009). Hence the situation seems to be 
the opposite since there are a lot of inequities in access to health care against the poor, 
children and women. The reason for this is that these groups need to spend a very high portion 
of their income on health care since the public sector admits lack of essential drugs to cover 
the priority group of patients. As a consequence, in Uganda poverty is a prohibitive factor in 
the use of the health services in cases where care is sought from the private health care 
providers or where there is need to spend a lot on transport to access health services. 
 
Priority Interventions 
In most cases the choice of which health intervention to give priority has a direct impact on 
health equity. For instance, giving priority to interventions that target communicable diseases 
gives priority to poor population’s health, while maternal health and immunisation programs 
would be prioritising women and children. Hence, other than stating health interventions and 
the ethical values to guide policy implementation separately as the case is with Uganda, it is 
possible to combine these two by giving priority to interventions that will enhance equity in 
health. In the case of Uganda, the following interventions are given priority. 
 
Health promotion and education 
This is regarded as the most cost-effective approach to contain the burden of communicable 
and non-communicable diseases, injuries and mental health problems. The policy expects 
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Health promotion and education to address major known health risk factors and health 
determinants, and is to be delivered through specifically targeted population-based programs 
involving different sectors like other ministries, schools, media, political leaders, civil society 
organisations et cetera (Republic of Uganda, MoH 2010). 
 
Disease prevention programs 
The reason for prioritising disease prevention programs is that its coverage like EPI, de-
warming, vitamin A supplementation, food fortification, Intermittent Prevention Treatment 
and Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission has in the past not been adequate enough to 
achieve the expected reduction in disease burden.  This is inline with the commitment to put 
ahead maternal and child health (Republic of Uganda, MoH 2010). 
 
Early Diagnosis and Treatment 
The policy commits the ministry to giving priority consideration to early diagnosis and 
treatment activities. These shall be expanded through improving access to these health 
services and awareness of the existence of these services among communities. However, what 
is controversial is that the policy guarantees treatment for all those who go for early diagnosis 
(Republic of Uganda, MoH 2010). 
 
Other Priority Areas 
In addition to the above priorities in the Uganda national health policy are the following areas: 
- Strengthening district health systems in line with decentralisation through training, 
technical assistance and financial support. 
- Reconceptualising and organising supervision and monitoring, including the clinical 
supervision of health workers at all levels of government health system. 
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- Improving the collection and utilisation of data for evidence-based decision making at 
all levels. 
- Establishing a functional integration between the public and the private sectors in 
health care delivery, training and research. 
- Redefining the institutional framework for training health workers. Including the 
mandate of all sectors, leadership and coordination mechanisms, with the aim of 
improving both the quantity and quality of health workers’ production (Government of 
Uganda, MoH 2009:11).  
 
Primary Health Care (PHC) 
The above listed areas of priority along with the strategies of improving the health care 
system will be applied in the delivery of the minimum health care package. The Uganda’s 
national health policy commits the government to prioritise Primary health care, usually 
referred to as Uganda National Minimum Health Care Package (UNMHCP). The UNMHCP 
involves addressing the earlier said four immediate categories of health needs and causes of 
the high burden of disease and the resultant high mortality and morbidity (sexual and 
reproductive health, child health and promotion, and control and prevention of HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and Tuberculosis). This is expected to be done through ensuring a steady supply and 
accessibility to all people of Uganda what is referred to as the essential medicines, elsewhere 
in this work referred to as the ‘indicator medicines’ - “coartem Yellow, salfadoxine 
pyrimethamine tab, contrimaxole 480mg tab, Oral Rehydration salt Sachet, 
medroxyprogesterone injection (“Depo”) (Government of Uganda MoH 2010:13). 
 
The above is in kilter with the overall objective within the Health Sector Strategic Plan II 
(Republic of Uganda, MoH 2008:14) framework which is to ensure the availability of 
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adequate quantities of good essential medicines and health supplies required for the delivery 
of the Uganda National Minimum Health Care Package at all levels of health care delivery. 
This has been the general and major objective for the health sector for a long time (Republic 
of Uganda, MoH 2008:116).  
 
According to the Uganda national drug authority, the goal of drug distribution is “to establish 
and maintain a distribution system which ensures equitable access to, and constant availability 
of essential drugs throughout the country (Republic of Uganda, MoH 2002:10).” One of the 
strategies of ensuring equitable and constant distributions is “to produce guidelines, establish 
systems and incentives to promote and introduce statutory controls as required for enforcing 
the equitable distribution of drug outlets (Republic of Uganda, MoH 2002:10). As far as drug 
financing is concerned, the vision is to ensure that sufficient funds are available to maintain a 
regular and adequate supply of the required essential drugs and equitable access to these by 
the population. The objectives here include: to develop and support suitable and sustainable 
drug financing mechanisms at all levels; to encourage private sector investment in appropriate 
pharmaceutical service provision and pharmaceutical manufacturing. The strategy to be 
employed to ensure this is done is by ensuring adequate Ministry of Health budget allocations 
for procurement of drugs and medical supplies (Government of Uganda, Health Policy 
2009:20). 
 
Given actual priority setting literature and real health out comes in the system, priority setting 
in Uganda’s health care system is hard to identify. It gives an impression that all health needs 
of Ugandans as understood by the government are of equal importance and urgency. The 
consequence of this is that there is no hope of tilting the balance of justice in favour of the 
most vulnerable groups of people such as the poor, women and children.  
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Conclusion 
By and large, in this chapter I have shown that Uganda is generally severely deprived of its 
moral entitlement to good and enabling health care. I have also argued that other than the 
injustice at a societal level which affects the country as a whole, there is yet another level of 
injustice which is even graver for those that suffer it. This deeper level of injustice is 
inequitable distribution of the health deprivation. The third point I have made is that the 
process of priority setting in the allocation of health in Uganda is not systematic enough to 
alleviate this latter injustice. I have argued that according to the available information about 
priority setting in Uganda health care, it is not easy to distinguish between the different 
objectives in terms of the relative importance attached to each to the others. It appears that 
everything that needs to be done in the system is priority. Even though some efforts are made 
to state priorities such as health promotion and education, disease prevention and programmes, 
early diagnosis and treatment, the commitment to treat all those that will seek early diagnosis, 
rehabilitation of health facilities among others make Uganda’s health care priorities quite 
indeterminate. Hence, given the above listed priorities and their failure to reflect special 
concern for the poor, women and children, as the values for health implementation promise, it 
can be said that Uganda lacks clear and systematic priority setting mechanisms which need to 
be developed as soon as possible if the system is to function justly and efficiently. Most 
important to note is that the severe underfunding of the system leads to heavy reliance on the 
private sector – implying a 50% out-of pocket funding of health services. With extreme 
poverty in Uganda and very unequal income distribution, it means that this kind of financing 
mechanism is inequitable and disproportionately adversely affects the poor, hence inequity in 
health generally. 
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Chapter 2 
Utilitarianism in Health: the use of QALYs in Health Rationing 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I have made three points: after presenting the background to Uganda’s 
health care system I have argued in my first point, that Uganda, as a country, is suffering 
health-related injustice because of severe deprivation to health entitlements. I have shown that 
this is due to the underfunding of the health sector. The second point I made is that, apart 
from the health-related injustice suffered by Uganda as a country, there is an even deeper 
level of this injustice within Uganda. This injustice consists in an unequal distribution of the 
burden of health deprivation. I have shown that this is mainly due to the inequitable financing 
mechanisms that Uganda relies on to finance the health system. The third point I made is that, 
considering the real process of priority setting that subsists in Uganda and the outcome of this 
process, there is no hope that justice will be done in the near future since it is still the poor, 
women and children that suffer it most. I indicated that as a consequence, the whole system 
has evidently disproportionately negatively affected the poor’s access to health services and 
has endangered the poor household’s livelihoods.  
 
Having shown the extent and distribution of health-related injustice in Uganda, and 
considering that at present Uganda’s efforts are not promising to make any significant 
positive difference, in this chapter I will analyse one of the most influential theories in 
philosophy and which has been widely used in the allocation of health care resources in 
Uganda as elsewhere in the world. By giving priority to efficiency against equity, Uganda has 
evidently relied on this theory to the letter. For this reason, therefore, in this chapter I will 
examine the theory of utilitarianism, but specifically its relevance to health resource allocation.  
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In this endeavour, I will make three main points. First, I will show that the QALY approach 
that is widely used to take decisions on health resource allocation is strictly based on the 
theory of utilitarianism with its maximising principles. In doing this I will explain the 
methods and tools used to come up the final QALYs and show that they are note value free, 
but actually promote utilitarian values. In the second point of this chapter I will show that 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the application of utilitarianism in health resource 
allocation. I will do this by presenting a brief justification of using utilitarian-based QALY 
approach to health resource allocation. I will further proceed to show, in the third point that 
QALY approach, though important for ascertaining efficiency in the use of health resources, 
misses out on other equally important moral principles and values that are supposed to be 
pursued in health resource allocation, especially those that aim at achieving distributive 
justice. But before making these three points I will start by highlighting briefly what the 
theory of utilitarianism is, and how it underpins the QALY approach. I will then show a very 
brief evolution of the QALY approach to health care rationing and then proceed to make the 
three central points mentioned above. 
 
The Theory of Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism in its manifestation as QALY maximisation is so far the best available 
theory/tool used for ascertaining efficiency in the allocation of scarce health care 
interventions. The theory of utilitarianism has been widely discussed and in great detail. For 
this reason therefore, I have no intention of repeating this discussion in this work. Instead, I 
will make a few remarks that are central to the theory and which are relevant for priority 
setting in health: that is, the basis of QALY approach to health resource allocation.  
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The theory of utilitarianism, also called ‘utilism’, is traced to Jeremy Bentham’s 18th Century 
propagation of welfarism. In its classical statement in An Introduction to the principles of 
Morals and Legislation, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to 
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the 
same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness" (Bentham 1781:II) 
However, in its modern statement and which is taken into consideration in this work, the 
theory of utilitarianism is based on the premise that an action is right if it produces as much or 
more of an increase in aggregate utility for all parties affected by it than any alternative action, 
and wrong if it does not. Hence, utilitarianism is the idea that the moral worth of an action, 
decision or policy is determined solely by its usefulness in maximizing aggregate utility. This 
is what has been the basis of the QALY approach in health. 
 
Further, according to Jeremy Bentham’s original statement of the theory of utilitarianism, it is 
clear that aggregation of utility is central to this theory. The idea of aggregation is derived 
from his contention that: 
 
The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the 
phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. [but] When it has a 
meaning, it is this: The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons 
who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then 
is, what is it? -- the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it (Bentham 
1781:iv). 
 
These are the two most important utilitarian ideas (utility maximisation and aggregation of 
utility) that have shaped the QALY approach in the allocation of health resources. 
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QALY – What it is 
The acronym ‘QALY’ stands for Quality Adjusted Life Years. According to the medical 
dictionary, “Quality adjusted life year, [is] a year of life adjusted for its quality or its value” 
(MedicineNet, Inc. 1996-2010). For instance, a year in perfect health is considered equal to 
1.0 QALY. The value of a year in ill health would be discounted by multiplying it with a 
lower weight assigned to it. For example, a year a bedridden life might have equals to 0.5 
QALY (MedicineNet, Inc. 1996-2010). In this case such a year would count half a QALY. On 
the other hand Mo Malek defines a QALY as “an outcome measure that takes into 
consideration both the quantity and quality of extra life provided by a health care intervention. 
It is an arithmetic product of the life expectancy and the quality of the remaining years” (Mo 
Malek 2001). In other words, the utility that is gained from investing in health care 
intervention is usually expressed as ‘QALYs gained’. Hence, I will be using the concepts 
‘health utility’ and ‘QALY’ interchangeably. 
 
Utilitarianism’s Influence on QALY Approach 
I have just presented the meaning of the theory of utilitarianism with its two central tenets. I 
have also given a brief, but basic, explanation of what QALY approach is about in health 
resource allocation. The one point I want to make here is to call attention to the fact that the 
QALY approach with its major aim of health utility maximisation or cost effectiveness is a 
reflection of the core value of utilitarianism which is aggregate-utility maximisation.  
 
It should be noted that in virtually all health interventions, the commonest question is about 
whether the intervention is cost effective (McGregor 2003). Indeed, this question is 
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increasingly asked about health interventions as the concerned health systems or financing 
bodies of those systems attempt to achieve the maximum health benefits from limited health 
care resources at their disposal. Consequently, cost–effectiveness analysis (CEA), which 
attempts to determine exactly how much health utility is achieved for each dollar spent, is 
playing a greater role in shaping most health care systems (McGregor 2003). According to 
Maurice McGregor, one form of cost–effectiveness analysis, cost–utility analysis, allows the 
comparison of different health outcomes (such as prolongation of life, prevention of blindness 
or relief of suffering) by measuring them all in terms of a single unit - the quality-adjusted 
life-year (QALY). To do this, any state of health or disability is assigned a utility on a scale 
ranging from 0 (immediate death) to 1 (a state of perfect health). The outcome of any health 
intervention, (expressed as QALYs to be gained), can then be calculated as the product of the 
increase in utility (from zero to one) that it may cause and the time in years over which it may 
be enjoyed. Following this procedure, when allocating scarce resources, those interventions 
that are expected to produce fewer QALYs for any given cost in comparison to those they 
compete with, are given a lower priority (McGregor 2003). Hence, all the QALY tools and 
methods presented later in this chapter are designed in such a way that the final decisions 
based on QALY approach would lead to the maximisation of QALYs which are a reflection 
of health utility. It is important also to note that QALY approach is, and should be understood 
as QALY maximisation. So, I will use the concepts ‘QALY approach’ and ‘QALY 
maximisation’ interchangeably. 
 
Evolution of QALY Approach  
Although much newer than the theory of utilitarianism, QALY’s philosophical parent is 
utilitarianism as seen above. Quality-adjusted life years approach (QALYs) has been used in 
the assessment of health interventions for at least three decades now. The popularity of the 
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QALY approach has been constantly increasing, although the debate on its theoretical 
underpinnings and practical moral implications is still going on.  
 
According to Franco Sassi, the term ‘quality-adjusted life year’ (QALY) was first used in 
1976 by Zeckhauser and Shepard to indicate a health outcome measurement unit that 
combines duration and quality of life (Franco 2006). But according to Fanshel and Bush, 
(2007:1021–66), among others, the underlying idea had been formally shaped in the early 
1970s in the development of a ‘health status index’. It is worth noting that prior to these 
developments a study of the treatment of chronic renal disease by Klarman and his colleagues 
had used a subjective adjustment for quality of life (Klarman, Francis, Rosenthal 1968). Early 
applications of the health status index include one on tuberculin screening (Klarman, Francis, 
Rosenthal 1968) and one on screening for phenylketonuria (Bush, Chen, Patrick 1973). The 
QALY framework provided a basis for the development of a number of health outcome 
measures, including the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) in the early 1990s. The DALY is 
primarily a measure of disease burden (disability weights measure loss of functioning) but its 
use in cost-effectiveness analysis is also relatively common (Franco 2006). 
 
Determining Health Utility 
As noted above, QALY approach to health care decision-making regarding resource 
allocation is based on utilitarianism’s central tenet of utility maximisation. For the purpose of 
ensuring health utility maximisation, a number of methods are used. 
 
Estimating QALYs 
The estimation of QALYs is done using health preference/utility values. According to Smith 
and others, there are a number of elements and methods in eliciting these health preference 
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values. But most of these elements and methods have been said to raise methodological issues. 
The main and controversial element is the assignment of these preference values, sometimes 
known as “utilities,” to different health states. “To accomplish this, different health states 
need to be classified and described to a respondent, who then values them relative to one 
another, or an anchor point such as death” (Smith, et al  2009). Then a general index (Health 
Utilities Index - HUI) is created for each health state for universal and constant reference in 
calculating QALYs. Through research in this area a number of classification systems have 
been developed and these are particularly important in the case of the generic health utility 
measures. Some of these classification systems are the EuroQoL which uses five dimensions 
of quality of life, usually referred to as the EQ-5D.  
 
Apart from the EQ-5D technique used to come up with a HUI, there are alternative 
approaches for eliciting the health state preference values. These are the standard gamble, the 
time trade-off, and the person trade-off. But in eliciting these health preference values, the key 
issue is that of “whose values” should be used as the source of values, - that is, between the 
candidates including patients, decision-makers, and the general public (Smith, et al  2009). 
“The weights or value “tariffs” of all the generic measures are based on surveys of the general 
public, although the EQ-5D also includes an assessment of self-rated health, which would be 
from patients when the measure is used in the context of a clinical study” (Smith, et al  2009). 
 
There exists yet another important element in estimating the total QALYs to be gained from a 
given health-care intervention. This is the aggregation of QALYs across all the recipients. 
Generally, “the standard approach is to treat all QALYs gained as being equal, no matter to 
whom they accrue (Smith et al 2009). This is against ‘prioritarianism’ in health as we shall 
see later. Hence, this approach is questioned by some who argue that QALYs may have a 
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different weight depending on, for example, the individual’s initial health state, or the state to 
which their health is raised” (Smith, et al  2009). 
 
It is worthy noting that the basis of QALY and all its techniques of collecting and analysing 
data is the view that, when comparing health care programs, two of the most important 
outcome attributes are survival duration and quality of life. Hence, for purposes a health 
program evaluation and clinical decision analysis, it is frequently desirable to measure health 
outcomes as a single score that takes into account trade-offs between quality of life and 
survival durations. And “Following the axiom that individuals are the best judges of their own 
welfare, this score should also stem from individuals' preferences since ignoring these 
preferences in the process of decision making can result in choosing the wrong (i.e., less 
preferred) service” (Gale Group, Inc 2006). 
 
Methods used to determine Health Preference Values 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the various method and tools used to determine the 
health benefits of an intervention, it is important to take note that this is not done for its own 
sake. Rather, as I stated earlier, it is to show that the choice of method in this case is not 
value-neutral. In the final analysis it will be seen that these methods promote utilitarian values.  
 
In the effort to ascertain efficiency or cost effectiveness, an analysis (CEA) is usually carried 
out to predict about how much health utility will be gained by investing in a given health 
intervention. This process involves collecting data from the patients and the general public 
about how much value they attach to certain health interventions. To do this, special 
techniques or methods for eliciting health state preference values are used to establish how 
many QALYs will be gained from the proposed intervention. For this purpose special 
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approaches or tools are employed. The commonly cited tools are the time trade-off technique 
(TTO), person trade off (PTO), Standard Gamble (SG) and the EQ-5D using the Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) 
 
The EuroQoL five dimensions method (EQ-5D)  
The EuroQoL five dimensions (EQ-5D) has been regarded as one of the most commonly used 
generic method to measure health-related quality of life (HRQoL) (Gusi, Olivares, Rajendram 
2010). According to Gusi and colleagues, “The conceptual basis of the EQ-5D is the holistic 
view of health, which includes the medical definition, as well as the fundamental importance 
of independent physical, emotional and social functioning” (Gusi, Olivares, Rajendram 2010). 
Accordingly, the concept of health in EQ-5D encompasses both positive aspects (well-being) 
and negative aspects (illness). It consists of a questionnaire and an EQ-Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS). The EQ-VAS is a self-rated health status using a VAS. The EQ-VAS records the 
subject’s perceptions of their own current overall health and can be used to monitor changes 
with time. The self-assessment questionnaire is a self-reported description of the subject’s 
current health in 5 dimensions i.e., mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and 
anxiety/depression. The subject is asked to grade their own current level of functioning in 
each dimension into one of three degrees of disability (severe, moderate or none), but there 
has been a move to increase the levels of well-being even up to ten. Each health state can be 
ranked and transformed into a single score called the utility. The utility score is an expression 
of the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) (Gusi, Olivares, Rajendram 2010).  
 
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS)  
Gould D. et al, define a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) as “a measurement instrument that tries 
to measure a characteristic or attitude that is believed to range across a continuum of values 
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and cannot easily be directly measured” (Gould, et al, 2001 ). Generally, the Visual Analogue 
Scale is a tool used to help a person rate the intensity of certain sensations and feelings such 
as pain. In health this tool is used for introspection about the respondent’s health state. For 
instance, the visual analogue scale for pain is a straight line labelled zero to one (sometimes 
one to ten). In some cases it uses qualitative descriptions of the patients’ feelings that are 
arranged to correspond with the numbers on the VAS. Yet, some times a plain line is used 
showing only two ends (No pain, at one end, and worst possible pain at the extreme end).  A 
patient makes a point on the line that they feel matches the amount of pain they feel or use 
descriptive words that they feel best describes their level of pain. Some times it is used to 
decide the right dose of a pain-relieving medicine.   
 
Figure 1: An Illustration of visual Analogue scales 
  
From ‘Management of Cancer Pain: Adults:’ (AHCPR 1994, Yolanda, Sculpher 2008). 
It should be noted that the visual analogue scale is used to determine the severity of ill –health. 
To determine the value or benefit of treatment/intervention, the patient is asked to rate their 
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level of health before and after treatment in order to find out how much they have been helped 
by the treatment received, or how much quality of life or health utility they have gained. Also, 
the visual analogue scale is used directly to determine the value attached to one’s life in a 
given health state by reading directly where they say their condition falls on the scale – say 
8.5. 
 
The Standard Gamble technique (SG) 
It is a method used to elicit preferences to treatment decisions that will have a direct impact 
on the lives of the respondents. It gives a series of choices which are purported to allow the 
researcher to estimate the strength of the respondent’s preferences regarding a specific health 
state under consideration. This technique is believed to help its users to understand how the 
respondent thinks having a particular health condition would compare to being in perfect 
health or being dead (Amiram 1994). According to Amiram Gafin, “The Standard Gamble 
(SG) technique is recommended for measurement of individuals' preferences under 
uncertainty. It expresses the outcome of different therapeutic choices in utility values to be 
used in clinical decision analysis and health program evaluation” ((Amiram 1994). 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of a Standard Gamble decision tree. 
 
 
Adopted from Drummond et al (2004). 
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The SG has two alternative choices: accepting treatment or no treatment. Whereas the ‘no 
treatment’ choice has the sure outcome of maintaining the health status quo, the treatment 
option has two probabilities (P and 1-P – in the figure above). Outcome P would lead to 
health after treatment, while 1-P would lead to death from the same treatment - say an 
operation. Normally, the outcomes of treatment are assigned probabilities of occurrence – say 
P = 0.6 and 1-P = 0.4. The choice made by the patient bearing in mind the probability of death 
indicates how much importance they attach to their lives without treatment. If patients make a 
choice for treatment when the probability of death is high, then it means that they are living 
with severest pain worth risking their lives with treatment. In this process the probabilities 
keep on being varied up to a point when the patient feels indifferent to whichever choice that 
is taken of the two. The point at which they are indifferent between the two choices is what is 
taken to be the value of the current health state. 
 
Time Trade-Off  
Time trade-off is a tool used in health economics to help determine the quality of life of a 
patient or group of patients. Using this technique, the individual will be presented with a set 
of directions such as: 
 
Imagine that you are told that you have 10 years left to live. In connection with this you are 
also told that you can choose to live these 10 years in your current health state or that you can 
choose to give up some life years to live for a shorter period in full health. Indicate with a 
cross on the line the number of years in full health that you think is of equal value to 10 years 
in your current health state (Burstrom, Johannesson, Diderichsen 2006:359–370). 
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In other words the basic question asked in time-trade-off technique is ‘In your current health 
state, how much of your remaining life expectancy would you give up so as to live in perfect 
health? In this case the health utility of an intervention is the sacrifice they are willing to 
make. In both TTO and SG methods of estimating the utility of a health intervention, the 
respondents are expected to make a sacrifice of part of their remaining life years or risk the 
whole of their remaining life expectancy for the sake of gaining perfect health from an 
intervention. The utility of the intervention is then normally estimated in terms of how much 
of their remaining life expectancy the respondents are willing to forego to be in perfect health. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of time trade-off 
 
Adopted from Yolanda and Sculpher 
(2006). 
 
According to the above illustration one has alternative 1 of living up to‘t’ years in a state of 
poor health - ‘health state alternative i’. But the patient, because of the value they attach to an 
intervention that would restore their perfect health may choose alternative 2 to give up ‘x-t’ 
years (in the figure) in order to gain a top-up on their health (from health state i to 11111), 
hence live in a better health state 11111. Hence, the value of their life without treatment 
would be represented by the following equation: 
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Let the value of perfect health = 1 
Hence, the value of health without treatment = 1 – ((t – x)/t). 
 
Following this equation it means that if a person’s remaining life expectancy was 10 years 
(between ‘0’ and ‘t’ in the figure above), and assuming that ‘x’ stands at the sixth point, it 
would mean that the value a person attaches to their life without treatment is 0.6. Differently 
put, to such a patient, 10 years in their current ill-health is equivalent to 6 years in perfect 
health, or 6 QALYs. Hence, an intervention that would restore their perfect functioning would 
be valued at 4 QALYs. 
 
The person Trade-off Technique (PTO)  
One method proposed to determine the value society attaches to certain health benefits is what 
has been called the ‘Equivalence of Numbers’ or Person Trade-Off technique (Pinto1997:71–
81) . According to Richardson, in using this method respondents are normally asked questions 
such as: “if there are x people in adverse health situation A and y people in adverse health 
situation B, and if you can only help (cure) one group, which group would you choose?” 
(Richardson 1994:39). One of the numbers x or y can be varied until the subject finds the two 
groups equivalent in terms of needing or deserving help. The undesirability (disutility) of 
situation B is x/y times as great as that of situation A’ (Pinto 1997:71-81). PTO has been said 
to be advantageous because it asks the right question. According to Pinto “If the values of the 
health states were used to make trade-offs between people, the best thing to do would be to 
ask that question directly. “Better than standard gamble would be equivalence of numbers, 
whereby trade-offs between different people’s lives are clear. Best of all would be explicit 
QALY bargain questions. … Without some such explicit link between the questions used to 
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establish quality indices and the allocations generated by QALYs, QALYs will remain 
persistently suspicious” (Pinto1997:71-81). 
 
Like the name suggests, person trade-off means exchanging one person’s life (or a group of 
people) or improvement in health for another person’s upon a conviction that the life or health 
of the person lost or denied treatment is of less social value than of the one whose life is saved 
or treatment given. According to Williams, Mulley, Nord, allocating scarce resources in 
health care essentially means dealing with person trade-offs (Mulley 1989, Nord 1992). To 
Nord, “the person trade-off technique is a way of estimating the social value of different 
healthcare interventions. It basically consists in asking people how many outcomes of one 
kind they consider equivalent in social value to ‘X’ outcomes of another kind”(Nord 1994). 
For instance, if a given treatment ‘A’ is twice the cost of treatment ‘B’, then it is advisable to 
give priority to treating two patients who need treatment ‘B’ at the cost of the patient that 
needs treatment ‘A’. In other words, the life or good health of one person will have been 
traded-off or exchanged or sacrificed for that of the other two patients. This is what 
essentially lies at the heart of attempting to maximise health utility from the available 
resources using QALY approach. A practical example of person trade-off is one that faced the 
Oregon Health Commission of having to choose between spending health resources on 100 
patients that needed tooth capping, or on one person that needed renal dialysis, whereby in 
both choices the costs would be the same (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
Calculation of final QALYs:  
Generally, according to most literature on QALYs, “The technical term for respondents’ 
preferences is utility. Utility values can be gathered by asking people about their preferences 
for various health states” (Mo Malek 2001 ), using methods and tools shown above. And once 
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these utility values are obtained, the calculation of QALY proceeds by multiplying the utility 
value of a health state by the length of time spent in that health state. Hence, “one year of 
perfect health (utility value of 1) equals one QALY, which is a product of one and one. 
Similarly, two years spent in a health state with a utility value of 0.75 equals 1.5 QALYs, or 
1.5 years of perfect health” (Mo Malek 2001 ) which is also obtained by multiplying 0.75 by 2. 
 
Determining cost effectiveness using QALYs 
The essence of determining cost effectiveness is to ascertain whether the health care 
intervention under consideration will maximise health benefits. This is the major aim of this 
utilitarian-based QALY approach to health rationing. A cost effective health intervention is 
normally one that makes it possible to get the highest aggregate health utility possible using a 
fixed budget. 
 
Calculating QALYs per se does not tell whether or not the intervention under consideration 
will lead to health benefit maximisation. Rather, the cost effectiveness of health care 
programmes is determined by calculating cost per QALY. Utility values, and therefore 
QALYs, are calculated for any health care intervention where there is a measure of utility for 
health states following the intervention. If the costs associated with the intervention can also 
be calculated, then a cost utility value can be derived (McGregor 2003). This is expressed in 
units of cost per QALY and provides an estimate of how much it would cost to provide one 
year of perfect health (that is, one QALY) following that intervention. In other words, these 
estimates represent a measure of the value for money that the intervention provides. Given a 
number of competing interventions, priority is then given to the intervention that will lead to 
the acquisition of the most QALYs using the same amount of resources.  
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The Moral Status of QALYs in Health Rationing 
I have so far made a point about how QALY is actually based on utilitarianism’s maximising 
principles. I have done this through the discussion of the main methods and tools used to 
ensure that maximum health utility is gained from an intervention. The point I want to make 
below is to argue that there is nothing inherently wrong with health benefit maximisation. I 
will do this very briefly by showing that there is a valid moral justification of using the 
QALY approach in the allocation of scarce health resources and later show the ‘fairness gaps’ 
left behind by total reliance on QALY approach in health resource allocation.   
 
Justification of using QALYs 
The application of the theory of utilitarianism in health resources allocation has been 
vehemently criticised especially for its alleged blindness to distributive justice. However, 
even though this may true (as I will show in my third point immediately after this one),  
limited efforts, if any, have been made to show a logically valid moral justification of using 
QALY-based utilitarianism in the allocation of scarce health interventions at the disposal of 
the public sector. What may be considered to be the usefulness or the positive side of using 
QALY as a tool of health policy analysis is summarised in the following argument:  
 The state or government has the primary moral duty of stewardship in managing the 
country’s health care resources on behalf of its populace.  
 The concept of stewardship presupposes the task of ensuring prudence or rational use 
of national resources.  
 Rational use of resources (economic rationalism) implies achieving the possible 
maximum gains from the available resources – cost effectiveness/efficiency.  
 Utilitarian-based QALY approach is the best tool available so far used to ascertain 
efficiency in the use of health resources.  
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 Therefore, the state/government has a moral duty of, and is morally justified to rely on 
the use of QALYs to ascertain efficiency in the use of health care resources. 
If the above argument should be qualified as valid, then from moral point of view, the 
government is morally justified to rely on QALY approach in the decisions regarding priority 
setting between competing health care interventions. Therefore, “cost-effectiveness is not 
merely an economic concern, because improving people’s health and well-being is a moral 
concern, and an allocation of resources that is not cost-effective produces fewer benefits 
[hence weak moral legitimacy] than would have been possible with a different allocation” 
(Brock, Wikler 2005). Further, “cost effective analysis (CEA) identifies one important ethical 
criterion in evaluating health care interventions – producing the most benefits possible for 
individuals served by those interventions ...” (Brock, Wikler 2005). Hence, the moral 
justification of using QALYs is the fact that the government has a stringent duty of ensuring 
efficient use of its resources and producing as more health benefits as possible for its 
population. However, another question, as will be seen below, is whether it should matter how 
these health benefits are distributed or not. According to QALYs approach as it stands now, it 
does not matter how these benefits are distributed. 
 
Other than the above moral justification, it is further claimed that the QALY’s benefit for 
health-care evaluation is its applicability to “all individuals and all diseases” and can therefore 
be used to compare interventions across diseases and programs (Smith et al 2009). It is thus 
particularly important to outcomes researchers as they attempt to evaluate the efficacy and 
cost of various health-care interventions and to health-care decision makers as they weigh 
implementation or purchase of healthcare technologies, including diagnostics, devices, and 
medications programs (Smith et al 2009). This QALY analysis has been used by some health-
care systems, such as the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) of the 
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British National Health Service (NHS) to determine health-care priorities; and QALYs are 
also used in population health, to measure and compare the health of a community (Smith et 
al 2009). 
 
But if the use of QALYs in the allocation of health resources is justified as shown in the 
above argument, where do the doubts about its use come from? This is the question I am set 
to answer in my third point of this chapter, below.  
 
Doubts about the Moral status of QALY 
The answer to the question about the sources of doubt about reliance on QALY posed above 
has nothing to do with its logical and moral validity as the argument above shows. Rather, the 
ethical doubts about QALY are from the point of view of the moral implications of its level of 
technical accuracy and objectivity, on one hand; and its theoretical underpinning; that is, a 
realisation that other than utilitarianism, there are other strongly compelling moral principles 
in the allocation of health care resources that ought to be considered, yet they run counter to 
principles that underlie QALY approach. This is the idea that has been a basis of the various 
criticisms by various health ethicists and has been the motivation behind McGregor’s caution: 
“Cost-Utility analysis: Use QALYs only with great caution” (McGregor  2003). 
 
Doubt from Technicality  
The ability to compare directly the dollar cost of different health outcomes is attractive to the 
decision-maker. Although this is the case, caution should be taken that the use of QALY 
approach for this purpose has severe limitations and these must be widely understood, above 
all by the decision-makers who use QALYs (McGregor  2003).  
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Those that are sceptical about the use of QALYs in health resource allocation decisions insist 
that it must be objective and relevant such that it is applicable to the biggest percentage of the 
population affected by the policy in question. However, in practice it is always hard and often 
impossible to be sure that these conditions are met by QALY approach (McGregor 2003). One 
example that has been used to corroborate this claim is from the study of the drug called 
sildenafil which was carried out explicitly to help insurers decide whether they should cover 
the cost of this drug. This study was carried out by Smith and Roberts (2000:933-7).  
 
Sildenafil is a drug taken shortly before sexual intercourse to correct erectile dysfunction. 
However, this study was carried out because there was uncertainty as to whether insuring 
agencies and public health care should cover its cost. The study in question concluded that the 
cost–effectiveness (direct medical costs only) of taking sildenafil five times per month would 
be US$11 230 per QALY, and that this "compares favourably with other medical conditions, 
costing less than renal dialysis, cholesterol lowering medication, and coronary artery bypass 
grafting” (Smith, Roberts 2000). Following the above example, QALY’s relevance and 
objectivity has been seriously questioned.  
 
As noted above, the QALYs measured in the study should be applicable or relevant to the 
population that will be influenced by the policy in question. But the source of contention is 
that in the process of determining QALYs, utility estimates vary according to who is making 
the estimate, (Drummond, McGuire A  2001), hence severely limiting its relevance to the rest 
of the population. For instance, the increase in utility attributed to sildenafil in that study was 
based on a paper by Volk and colleagues (Volk, Cantor, Spann  1996) who questioned 10 
healthy men whose average age was 56 years, about the importance they attached to erectile 
function. Using the time trade-off technique, these men estimated that, compared with perfect 
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health, the reduction of utility they would experience with impotence would be 0.26 (i.e., they 
would forfeit 26% of their expected healthy life to avoid impotence!). However, when this 
was estimated by their wives, the result was remarkably different: 0.02 (they were willing to 
give up only 2% of their healthy life). Further, from responses of cancer patients on the utility 
they attach to a life lived in impotence, physicians who treat prostate cancer have estimated 
the loss of utility attributable to impotence to be 0.05 (Fleming, Wasson, Albertsen, Barry 
Wennberg 1993) and 0.15 (Klarman, Francis, Rosenthal 1968). Hence, following these 
radically different utility values attached to the same health condition by different groups of 
people, there is not yet unanimity as to whose viewpoints should be used when making 
societal policy decisions (McGregor 2003). This example illustrates the difficulty in achieving 
objectivity and universal relevance of decisions to treat certain health conditions because, in 
this case, how important it is to treat this condition will depend on which (whose) utility 
estimates one uses. In this example the policy based on the QALY approach would be 
relevant only to men and not women. This domination of one group by another is arbitrary 
and out of consonant with the concept of individual autonomy of each candidate for health 
care, and is a moral evil. Even though it may be impossible to respect every individual’s 
autonomy in the allocation of health resources, but the wider the relevance of the allocation 
decision the better. 
 
Doubt from Theoretical Underpinning 
The most debatable issue about the use of QALY approach in analysing the cost effectiveness 
of any health intervention is its theoretical underpinning. Hence, the ethical implications 
involved in QALY-based Cost-Effective Analysis (CEA) require closer attention. As shown 
earlier, utilitarianism, a very controversial moral theory, is CEA’s philosophical parent. 
Beauchamp and Childress have for example argued that, implicit in QALY-based CEA is the 
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idea that health maximisation is the only relevant objective of health services (Beauchamp, 
Childress 2001). However, some non-health benefits or utilities of health services also 
contribute to quality of life. Hence, the problem is that QALY-based CEA attaches utility 
only to selected outcomes while neglecting values such as how care is provided, and how it is 
distributed (whether universal access is provided) (Beauchamp, Childress  2001) 
 
Whereas everybody agrees that utility, and/or health and the utility therein, is a good thing, 
and that all other things being equal, more utility is better than less utility, many critics of 
utilitarianism attack it for its promotion of utility above all other human goals – in this case 
distributive justice.  Hence, as I have argued earlier, there is nothing intrinsically morally 
wrong with maximising utility, no matter how the concept is defined. Whatever a society 
counts as utility is worthy of pursuit and maximising. But in general or in particular, when 
applied to QALY as a basis of health resource allocation, health utility maximisation faces a 
number of challenges which its critics demand that they be addressed in health policy 
regarding resource allocation. Below, I will briefly discuss some of these challenges, one a 
time. 
 
QALYs and the value of health 
One of the questionable issues embedded in the QALY approach is the perception of the 
value of health held by its advocates. It is this perception that is the sole guiding principle of 
cost effective analysis and QALY in general. This perception is that health is an end in itself 
or, that health has an intrinsic value. This is one common ground that the opponents of QALY 
approach base on to cast doubt on the approach. Roger Crisp, to begin with, argues that the 
problem with QALY approach, with its basis in utilitarianism, makes a mistake of looking at 
health as an end in itself. It is normally tempting to think that, if health care is to promote well 
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being, then health care budgets should be spent so as to maximise  the well being, or expected 
well being of a population. This view would involve injustice. Instead, the reason we spend 
money on health care or what we are said to be purchasing through buying drugs, surgery and 
so on, is not health in itself. The common view in the QALY/utilitarian approach to health 
care policy analysis is that, health budgets should be spent with the sole aim of maximising 
the overall health of the population. This is what mistakes health for an ultimate good, since 
the good of health is only derivative or instrumental, to the extent that promotion of the 
possible maximum health in the population can not in itself justify expenditure on health care. 
(Beauchamp, Childress 2001). The final or ultimate good, to which health serves as a means, 
is well being or welfare – that which makes life worth living, or better, or for the person living 
that life. This is the feeling of justice with which people feel are being treated. According to 
Aristotle, the ultimate good to which health is a means, is a virtuous life; and justice is a 
virtue. 
 
It should be noted that the critics of QALY maximisation as a basis for rationing health 
resources are not opposed to maximising benefits from the available resources as such. Rather, 
the source of doubts about the use of QALYs is its extremism; that is, saying that health 
maximisation is or should be the sole aim of spending money on health care without taking 
into account distributional issues. Hence, the concern ought to be how to incorporate non-
health gains as opposed to gains only in terms of preventive and curative interventions into 
the health system and the policy that guides it. One way, for instance, of incorporating non-
health gains as one of the aims of a health system is to mitigate the consequences of total 
reliance on QALYs with concerns of distributive justice. In this way the utility gained from 
health interventions would be of both health and non-health utility which is generally believed 
to be of value to society.  
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Peter Singer and others argue that QALY approach as it stands now, leads to unfair 
recommendation about how the state should spend its health care resources. Generally, higher 
utility can be achieved by giving priority to the poor and the worst off even if the value they 
attach to their health is low and their prognosis is poor. The reason behind this argument is 
that utility in general is not to be found in health but in the way people perceive the extent of 
fairness, concern and compassion with which they are being treated. Hence: 
 
There is more to overall utility than health-related QALYs, and it is plausible to 
suppose that tilting the balance of health care towards the more disadvantaged 
members of society will reinforce feelings of concern and sympathy, and lead to a 
more compassionate society. This in turn may be a society with more community 
feeling and therefore one that provides a higher level of general welfare than a less 
compassionate society (Singer, McKie, et al. 1995).  
 
Life Years versus Lives 
The concept of ‘Quality Adjusted Life Years’, as defined earlier, implies that it is not 
automatic that all of one’s years of life are treated as ‘quality-adjusted life years. Rather, the 
number of QALYs a person is said to possess depends on the QoL they will enjoy after a 
health intervention. For instance, if one’s QoL if to be diminished by a certain permanent 
disability after treatment, then, all other things considered, they will gain fewer QALYs than 
another person with out any disability. And following the recommendation made based on the 
QALY approach the person with disability should be ruled out as a candidate to receive health 
care, if there are no extra resources available for them.  This is the logical implication of the 
move to maximise life years (QALYs). 
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Accordingly, QALYs attach more value to life years than on the number of human lives to be 
saved by an intervention. For instance, all things considered, QALY would give priority to a 
15 year old youth who is likely to live up to the age of 80, against 6 people whose lives would 
be extended by 10 years each. The reason for this is obvious – giving priority to the former 
would lead to the acquisition of 5 more QALYs. Put differently, given two equal groups of 
patients A and B with a similar and curable condition, but patients in group B have some 
permanent disabilities not target by the intervention under consideration, then QALYs would 
give priority to group A, all other things being equal more QALYs would be gained from 
group A – the concern here is not that the number of lives to be saved is the same, but it is 
that the number of QALYs to be gained is in favour of the group without any disability.  
 
To illustrate this point, the QALY approach in the above way puts the permanently disabled 
patient at a disadvantage. This applies in the following hypothetical case:  
Consider the out come of a QALY analysis to guide decision about two patients with retinitis 
pigmentosa of the same severity. But all other things being equal, the difference between 
these two patients being that one patient – say ‘A’ has a permanent disability that would give 
him about 0.8 QoL after a successful retinal implant; and on the other hand patient ‘B’ has no 
disability at all and would enjoy a QoL equal to 1.0. If both patients had equal life expectancy 
remainder – say 20 years, it then follows that patient ‘A’ would gain 16 QALYs while patient 
‘B’ would gain 20 QALYs. For the need to maximise life years gained, priority would be 
given to patient ‘B’.  This is what Singer and others mean when they talk about double 
jeopardy for the permanently disabled; that because of living a permanent ‘wheelchair life’ 
this patient should miss a life-improving intervention because there is someone that would 
lead a higher quality of life than him (Singer, McKie et al 1995). This is a kin to literally 
saying that,  
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… Therefore, take the talent from him and give it to the one who has ten. For the one 
who has will be given more and he will have more than enough. But the one who does 
not have, even what he has will be taken from him. And throw that worthless slave 
into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matthew 
25:28 – 30).  
 
In the health ethics discourse, Harris John raises a complaint against this way of doing things, 
in his double Jeopardy argument: 
 
‘QALYs dictate that because an individual is unfortunate, because she has once 
become a victim of disaster, we are required to visit upon her a second and perhaps 
graver misfortune. The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and QALYs 
then require that in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for life-saving 
treatment, or at best, that she be given little or no chance of benefiting from what little 
amelioration her condition admits of' (Harris  1987:17). 
 
Hence, from the above it can be seen that the use of the Quality Adjusted Life-Years (QALY) 
as a basis of allocation of health care resources is morally weak. This is for the reason that it 
gives a lower value to preserving the lives of people with a permanent disability or illness 
than to preserving the lives of those who are healthy and not disabled. The reason for this is 
that the quality of life of those with illness or disability is ranked, on the QALY scale, below 
that of someone without a disability or illness. Hence, following this line of analysis, we can, 
other things being equal, gain more QALYs by saving the lives of those without a permanent 
disability or illness than by saving the lives of those who are disadvantaged in these ways. 
This is injustice because it constitutes a double jeopardy for the already disadvantaged people 
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by worsening their deprivation to good health. “Not only do they suffer from the disability or 
illness, but because of it, a low priority is given to forms of health care that can preserve their 
lives. This is unjust or unfair”(Singer, McKie et al 1995).  Further, it is for this reason that 
Harris John believes that, “QALYs are a life-threatening device” because they suggest that 
life years rather than individual lives are valuable (Harris 1997:17). 
 
Priority to the worst off compromised  
The worst off in health care, though defined in many different ways, are basically understood 
to be those with urgent health needs – whichever way the concept of urgency may be defined. 
But many would agree that the severely ill, the poor and all those who are socially 
disadvantaged in ways that directly affect their health have the greatest need.4 One of the 
weaknesses of utilitarianism when applied to the allocation of health resources is that its 
principles compromise justice in health care by denying priority to the worst off. This is 
against the moral essence of social cooperation. It should be remembered that the overarching 
goal of social cooperation, and therefore social policy, is to ensure justice and fairness in 
society – defend the minority, the weak and the disadvantaged – the same reason behind 
Thomas Hobbes’ idea of  ‘the social contract’ - and an end to the state of nature (Hobbes 
1660:XIV). Further, it is reasonable that the guardians of a society act in such a way that they 
get the best and the most from the resources available to them. Although this is the case, they 
must care about how this utility or happiness is distributed. The argument against QALY 
approach is therefore that it does not respond appropriately to the issue of urgency or 
emergency in health care. Urgency in health care is expected to lead to priority to the patients 
with very severely painful and life-threatening illnesses as long as their prognoses are good. 
 
                                                 
4
 I will extent this argument in the next chapter (3) under ‘prioritarianism’ as one of the proposed principle for 
allocating health resources. 
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Nord argues that the assumption of "distributive neutrality" that underlies the QALY approach 
frequently violates societal concerns for fairness in the allocation of health care resources. For 
example, society does not consider a unit of health gained by a severely ill individual to be of 
equal value to a unit of health gained by an individual who is less severely ill (Nord  1999). 
McGregor adds that, though as yet unstudied, a QALY gained through correction of erectile 
dysfunction by an otherwise healthy individual would probably not be considered equivalent 
to a QALY gained through life-prolonging dialysis by an individual about to die from renal 
failure (McGregor 2005).  
 
QALY is anti-egalitarianism 
Further, those that care about equality of opportunity in health care have raised questions as to 
whether CEA is egalitarian; or whether policy based on cost effective analysis guarantees 
health equity. Even though the theory of egalitarianism has itself been subject to the levelling 
down objection (Holtug 1998), it is intended to achieve distributive justice in health. The truth 
about the QALY approach is that life years matter more than the number of lives saved, as 
argued above. For this reason, those with better prognoses are always favoured at the expense 
of those in the opposite state. In other words, the better-off are more entitled to health services 
than the worst-off. There can not be said to be equal treatment in this case. It is because of 
this feature of QALY-based CEA that makes it favour Life Years over individual lives 
(Hotlug 1998). In practice, proponents of QALY hold that each healthy life year is equally 
valuable for everyone; that a QALY is a QALY regardless of who possesses it. This argument 
is a very clear testimony that QALYs are indifferent to distributive justice. Instead, as 
opposed to this argument it should matter so much how fairly the QALYs are distributed. 
Hence, from the methods and tools of analysis used to come up with the final figure of 
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QALYs to be gained, the answer is no – QALY qua QALY is neither egalitarian nor does it 
lead to equity in access to health care.  
 
Aggregation of health output  
The aggregation problem in health consists in the dilemma of whether to provide small 
benefits to many people or large benefits to a few. The issue of aggregation is pertinent in 
health discourse because of the need to balance two most important aims of health systems. 
These are efficiency and equity. So the need to balance the two makes it necessary to try to 
resolve the dilemma posed by the aggregation problem.  
 
One serious criticism that has been levelled against QALY approach as a basis to decide on 
the allocation of scarce health care resources is related to problems with aggregation of health 
output, a principle that lies at the heart of utilitarianism. In health care, QALY usually aims at 
the aggregate of health benefits or the total sum of the health benefits obtained from any 
healthcare intervention. Aggregation in health is indifferent to whichever decision is taken as 
long as the maximum QALYs are obtained from that budget. The critics of QALY approach 
from the point of aggregation claim that it is utilitarian and it is interested in the overall health 
outcome of the system without caring about how fairy these benefits are distributed. Further, 
since aggregation is more interested in the highest QALYs possible, it does not respond to the 
issue of urgency. Urgency sometimes requires giving priority to those with severe pain and 
facing the immediate threat of death if left un-helped, even though doing this may result in 
comparatively fewer QALYs. 
 
On this subject (aggregation), Lubbe’s opinion is that “under conditions of scarcity, more of 
what is good seems better than less. … [but] I can think of no ethical basis for additive utility 
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aggregation if such aggregation is not fair” (Lube 2009:2).  Further claims of justice must not 
be weighed with other objectives, but must be redefined, not weighed, if there actually are 
legitimate objectives that are not compatible with satisfying them(Lube 2009:2). 
 
Defending QALY’s Aggregation 
There has been an attempt to show that aggregation in QALY calculations addresses the issue 
of urgency – that is, of priority to the worst off (Nord, Pinto, Richardson, Menzel, and Ubel  
1999). Apparently, Nord and colleagues claim that aggregation is compatible with fairness in 
health care resource allocation. They claim that it is possible to aggregate QALYs in an 
egalitarian way. They argue that: 
 
The egalitarian way of aggregating health benefits is the following. When we 
aggregate health benefits, we assign a greater weight to the lower level of health 
condition, and add up the weighted health benefits. In practice there would be several 
ways to do this. Here is one way. First, when we estimate the health related quality of 
life, we assign more weight to the serious disease. Second, we multiply by the number 
of years. Third, we add up the weighted QALYs, and choose the plan that maximises 
the weighted QALYs (Hiroes  2009:7). 
 
Their formula, they claim - and as matter of fact, “gives a greater moral importance to more 
serious illness, and hence meets the demand of urgency…” (Hiroes 2009:8).  
 
The above approach sounds ‘liberative’ to the QALY approach. It provides a promising step 
towards fairness in health care without losing a score on efficiency. On the contrary, however, 
this approach still does not address the ethical controversy that surrounds the concept of 
Quality-Adjusted Life Years: That is, is it morally admissible to hold as a general rule that, 
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people with any sort of disability are less human than those without; such that, all other things 
considered, the former should always be discriminated against in allocation of scarce 
resources in favour of the latter? In this case, whereas this new approach does well to give 
priority to the worse off by assigning serious illness a greater weight, this weight does not 
extend to the years of life saved, which he admits are not weighed. The reason for not 
weighing these years is that, “This is because I believe that the notion of urgency is concerned 
with how we react to a person’s serious situation at a given time (Hiroes 2009:8).” Hence, it is 
not clear how this new approach would proceed in a case as one below. 
 
Imagine person ‘A’ with a certain permanent disability, develops a very severely painful but 
treatable illness, such that without treatment her quality of life will be about 0.55 whereas 
after treatment she will live quality of life weighing 0.75. Another person, ‘B’, without any 
disability but with a less serious illness as that of ‘A’, and will live in 0.8 quality of life 
without treatment but can improve this to perfect health (1.0 weight) after treatment. In both 
cases no immediate threat of death is posed by the illness except life-long suffering. In this 
case, urgency is determined by the severity of one’s condition (pain or the degree of 
suffering). Hence, A’s need will be more urgent than B’s. And let us also assume that with or 
without treatment both patients have equal life expectancy remainder – say 20years. This 
automatically means, following the concept of ‘quality-adjusted life years’ that ‘B’ will gain 
20 QALYs while ‘A’ will gain 15 QALYs. The reason why QALY approach fails to 
accommodate the demand of urgency contrary to what Hiroes et al claim above, is that the 
greater importance attached to A’s condition does not extend to her years of life after 
treatment because of her permanent disability. Hence, her QALYs gained will remain 15 
against B’s 20. Since the concern is still the maximum Quality adjusted life years, it is not 
clear how the weight attached to A’s condition will affect how many QALYs she will gain. 
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So, if the decision on who should receive priority is to be based on the final number of 
QALYs to be gained, it would still be to the disadvantage of A, yet she is living in the most 
severe pain (urgency). It would be very unfair to give preference to B with less severe pain for 
the sake of gaining 20 QALYs at the expense of A, who is in severe pain but would only gain 
15 QALYs. 
 
Social Aversion for QALY Maximisation: Empirical Evidence 
In their survey of the attitudes of Australians to the distribution of health care, Nord and his 
colleagues report that they found that many respondents were ready to depart from QALY 
maximisation in order to avoid expressing a priority for the treatment of some patients over 
others. They attribute this kind of attitude towards QALY to people’s concern for the effects 
that a direct maximisation approach has on the kind of society we are. For example,  
 
When asked whether, among patients who are suffering equally, some priority should 
be given to those who will be helped most from treatment, only about half (53 per cent) 
of those answering favoured doing so; the remainder thought that those who could 
become a little better should have the same priority as those who could become much 
better. Even more striking responses were received to a hypothetical choice between 
patients who can be helped at low cost and those who are equally ill, but can only be 
helped at high cost. Overwhelmingly, 81 per cent of respondents favoured equal 
treatment irrespective of cost, except when the costs are extremely high. Even when 
presented with a hypothetical example showing that giving priority to low-cost 
patients would allow more patients to be treated overall, most respondents did not 
choose to maximise health benefits (Nord, et al 1995). 
 
Conclusion 
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Generally, according to the QALY approach, a cost-per-QALY ratio indicates the cost-
effectiveness of an intervention. As such, the ratio is a measure of efficiency, rather than of 
“fairness.”5 There is a great concern about the challenges raised by the failure of QALYs to 
account for distributive concerns, e.g., the relative priority given to individuals of different 
levels of current health, and/or different capacity to benefit in terms of life expectancy or 
health-related quality of life, as Drummond et al exemplify (Drummond, et al 2001). In 
decisions about resource allocation across patient groups, concerns for fairness will count 
alongside concerns for efficiency in the production of health. The reason for this is that such 
concerns may cause social resource allocation preferences to deviate considerably from the 
ranking that consideration of costs per QALY would suggest. These concerns have been 
raised internationally in all settings where cost-effectiveness analysis has been studied and/or 
applied (Drummond et al 2001). Therefore, this makes it morally unnecessary to base health 
resource allocation solely on utilitarian principles, hence there is need to consider other 
morally compelling values to guide decisions on health care rationing. I will explore some of 
these principles in the next chapter, and finally gauge whether these, together with QALY can 
be enough in ensuring health equity in Uganda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 This idea is shared by Weyma Lube who argues that there is a good reason for accepting that maximising 
overall health benefit [in itself] is not an ethical objective (Lube 2009:2). 
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Chapter 3 
Criteria for Rationing Health Resources: Ethical Dilemmas  
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I have discussed the major and commonly used theory – 
utilitarianism, and its consequent approach to priority setting in allocation of health care 
resources. I have argued that the philosophical underpinning of the QALY approach is really 
the theory of utilitarianism, that is, utility maximisation, although in this context it is 
understood as health utility or QALY maximisation. I have argued that the application of the 
utilitarian values in allocation of resources especially in extreme scarcity is not inherently 
morally wrong. I have further argued that whereas utilitarianism in health is not unethical in 
itself, for purposes of achieving equity it is not sufficient simply to base allocation decisions 
on utilitarianism alone. And for this reason, the QALY approach needs to be supplemented by 
taking care of additional moral concerns that are discussed in this chapter. 
 
In this chapter I argue that other than health benefit maximisation there are other highly 
compelling moral principles advanced that ought to guide the allocation of the scarce health 
resources. But whereas all these principles, or at least most of them, seem intuitively morally 
convincing when treated in isolation from others, none of them is strong enough on its own to 
guide the equitable allocation of health resources. The second argument is that, having noted 
the inefficiency of each single principle on its own, a combination of principles has been 
suggested in what is called the Complete Lives System. I argue that even though this 
combination avoids many dilemmas, it is not a perfect solution to all the dilemmas in the 
allocation of health interventions. In the third point I explore yet another suggestion that has 
been made to guide the allocation of health resources – the Fair Procedures suggestion. I 
argue that, as opposed to the ‘Fair Procedures’ suggestion’s claims of making unnecessary a 
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discussion on the substantive ethical principles of allocation, it is impossible to talk about 
equitable allocation of scarce resources without making reference to these controversial 
substantive ethical principles. I will present this chapter in three parts corresponding to the 
three points I have mentioned above. But before that, for purposes of emphasis, I will reiterate 
some general remarks about the on-going discussion as background to this chapter. 
 
Background 
As noted earlier, one of the greatest challenges facing the health sector globally and 
domestically is scarcity of resources to meet all the medical and non-medical health needs of 
all concerned populations. As a result, the latest and stringent concern in the provision of 
health care services, whether domestically or internationally, is fairness in allocating these 
scarce resources, and having to balance this with efficiency. Health care systems are normally 
evaluated in relation to how best they meet their most important aims and objectives. In this 
case, the most important aims of health care provision are justice/fairness, on one hand, and 
efficiency on the other. Health care systems and health care providers have found themselves 
in dilemmas, especially when these two important aims are in conflict.  
 
Generally, the aims of health care systems are not just limited to efficiency and fair 
distribution, even though these are accepted to be the most robust ones. Other aims and 
objectives of health systems include Health, quality, responsiveness and trust. Of these other 
aims, Mechanic has vehemently argued for the importance of ‘trust’ in a health system 
especially bearing in mind that with the existing resource constraints amidst endless health 
needs it is impossible to meet everybody’s needs (Mechanic 1995).  
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According to Brock and Wikler, it is now widely recognized that Cost Effective Analysis 
(CEA) or the QALY approach alone is not a satisfactory guide to resource allocation in all 
cases. There has been a realisation that CEA, as customarily formulated to measure the sum 
of costs and benefits from any health care intervention, largely ignores the pattern of their 
distribution across the affected population. “In some cases, the resulting allocation will strike 
most observers as unfair. Health resource allocators need to take distributional issues into 
account along with cost-effectiveness (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
For the purpose of ensuring equity in health a number of moral principles have been proposed 
and widely discussed for consideration when setting priorities in health care rationing. Even 
though most of these are valid, reflection on the need for equity in health suggests that some 
moral principles would command more moral weight than others, but still there is not yet 
agreement on which ones should count more than others. 
 
Part I 
Substantive Moral Principles for Health Rationing 
As I noted earlier, these principles are necessitated by the fact that, the theory of utilitarianism 
with its consequent QALY approach in the allocation of health resources is blind to concerns 
of distributive justice. Hence, in an effort to take care of these concerns without missing out 
on efficiency, a number of ethical principles have been suggested and highly debated. They 
include the principle of ‘treating people equally’, prioritarianism, ‘saving most lives’ versus 
‘life years’ instrumentalist views, allocation by need and ‘fair chances and best outcomes’. 
Some of these principles seem to repeat utilitarian values but in this case they seek to 
incorporate concerns of distributive justice into health utility maximisation. I will examine 
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one at a time, below. In this part I will rely mainly on the overview by Persad and his 
colleagues who seem to have analysed these principles exhaustively. 
 
Treating people equally 
According to the principle of ‘treating people equally’, just allocation of scarce interventions 
consists in giving equal probability of getting or not getting such interventions to those who 
are equally entitled to them. In congruence with John Rawls’ view on how indivisible goods 
ought to be fairly distributed (Rawls  1999), many scarce medical interventions, such as organ 
transplants, are indivisible. For indivisible goods, benefiting people equally entails providing 
equal chances at the scarce intervention—equality of opportunity, rather than equal amounts 
of it (Persad, et al 2009: 423-431). But whereas it may be agreed that treating people equally 
is fair, it is controversial what exactly it means to treat people equally. The two options that 
are thought to lead to equal treatment of two individuals or groups of people are either 
allocation by ‘lottery’ and/or allocation on the basis of ‘first-come first served’. 
 
Allocation by Lottery 
One of the criteria believed to ensure equal chances of receiving care when resources are 
limited, is using lottery. This is mainly recommended in deciding between two individuals or 
groups that do not exhibit marked differences in their health needs. The arguments appealed 
to in favour of this criterion are that: “Equal moral status supports an equal claim to scarce 
resources. Even among only roughly equal candidates, lotteries prevent small differences 
from drastically affecting outcome” (Persad, et al 2009: 423-431). Some other people yet 
support lottery allocation because “each person’s desire to stay alive should be regarded as of 
the same importance and deserving the same respect as that of anyone else; and that 
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practically, lottery allocation is quick and requires little knowledge about recipients. Finally, 
lotteries resist corruption”(Broome 1984; 95: 38–55; Ramsey 2002; Harris 1985). 
 
Further, it is clear that lottery may not be a good option in allocating scarce medical 
interventions for the reasons that:  
 
The major disadvantage of lotteries is their blindness to many seemingly relevant factors. 
Random decisions between someone who can gain 40 years and someone who can gain only 4 
months, or someone who has already lived for 80 years and someone who has lived only 20 
years, are inappropriate. Treating people equally [in this case] often fails to treat them as 
equals (Stein 2002:212–45; Elhauge 1994:82,  Dworkin  2002). 
 
First-come First-served 
This is also called the ‘waiting time’ criterion. In this case, the available resources go to those 
that queue for them first. However, this principle is widely believed to be unfair. According to 
Daniels Norman, “It favours people who are well-off, who become informed, and travel 
quickly, and can queue for interventions without competing for employment or child-care 
concerns” (Persad, et al 2009: 423-431). Further this criterion of allocation is weak because it 
is not impervious to corruption. Hence, many out-rightly reject this criterion for the reason 
that it allows morally irrelevant qualities – such as wealth, power and connections – to decide 
who receives scarce interventions, something that makes it typically flawed. 
 
Prioritarianism 
Another set of moral principles that has been proposed for consideration in allocating scarce 
medical interventions comes under what is known as prioritarianism. According to 
prioritarians, “A benefit morally matters more the worse off the individual to whom it 
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accrues”(Hotlug 1998:132). Unlike egalitarians, prioritarians are note concerned about 
equality as a relation; instead, they are concerned with absolute levels of individual welfare. 
According to prioritarianism, a benefit that falls at a particular level of welfare has the same 
moral value no matter what levels other individuals are at. And the lower this particular level 
is, the greater the value of the benefit (Hotlug 1998:132). Hence, prioritarianism is based on 
the view that distributive justice requires a special concern for the worst off. According to 
John Rawls’ Difference Principle in his Theory of justice, “you can tell the justice of a society 
by how it treats its least well-off members. This concern is often understood to reflect a 
concern for equality— in particular, equality in outcomes or welfare between people” (Brock, 
Wikler 2005).  And when applied to the health care discourse, this principle takes the form of 
a concern for reducing inequalities in health between persons or groups. 
 
In the allocation of scarce health resources, priority to the worst off is seen as a favourable 
principle because, it is believed, “the worse off that people are, the greater is the relative 
improvement that a given size of [health] benefit will provide them, so the more the benefit 
may matter to them. Alternatively, the greater the undeserved health deprivation or need that 
an individual suffers, the greater is the moral claim to have it alleviated or met (Brock, Wikler 
2005). 
 
However priority to the worst off might be justified, there arise disagreements within this very 
principle. One common disagreement within this principle is the issue of who the worst off 
are. This disagreement has been exemplified that “In the context of resource allocation in 
health care, the worst off might be those who are globally worst off, those with the worst 
overall well-being (such as the poor), or those with the worst health (that is, the sickest)” 
(Brock, Wikler 2005). Yet, others think that the worst-off can be defined in terms of their age, 
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leading to a criterion like ‘youngest-first’. This distinction between different kinds of how 
people can be worst-off has come up because general theories of justice usually focus on 
people’s overall well-being, often allowing a lower level in one domain of wellbeing to be 
compensated for by a higher level in another domain” (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
But in response to these alternative interpretations of who the worst –off are, surprisingly,6 
there has been wide agreement about the claim that poverty is an irrelevant factor in the 
definition of who the worst off are. This argument has been advanced in what has been called 
a separate spheres view. According to the separate spheres view, the worst off for the purpose 
of health resource allocation should be considered to be those with worse health (Brock, 
Wikler 2005). In agreement with this position, Tim Scanlon has argued that, justice in health 
care resource allocation demands that “for differences in level to affect the relative strength of 
people’s claims to help, these differences have to be in an aspect of welfare that the help in 
question will contribute to” (Scanlon 1997:227). It has been argued that, from a pragmatic 
point of view, “it may generally be too difficult, costly, intrusive, and controversial, as well as 
too subject to mistake and abuse, to have to inquire into all aspects of people’s overall levels 
of well-being” (Brock, Wikler 2005). Two alternatives have been suggested about whom the 
worst off should be taken to be: that is, either the youngest or the sickest. 
 
Sickest-First Criterion 
Giving priority to the sickest is derived from one of the stringent prima facie rules of medical 
practitioners known as the ‘rule of rescue.’ According to this rule, “Our moral response to the 
imminence of death demands that we rescue the doomed” (Brock, Wikler 2005). Hence, 
treating the sickest people prioritises those with worst future prospects if left untreated. 
                                                 
6
 In chapter four I argue that the ‘separate spheres’ view that seeks to negate poverty in the definition of who the 
worst off are in health, is fallacious. There is a very necessary and strong determination between health and 
poverty. 
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Who is the sickest? There are disagreements about who the sickest are. The controversy is 
especially about the timing of the sickness. For instance, most people would agree that 
‘prevention is better than cure’ and may therefore be inclined to give priority to preventive 
interventions at the expense of curative and rehabilitative ones. This arises from the issue of 
whether the worst off in health are those with worse health - those who are sickest now at the 
time a health intervention would be provided for them, or those with worse health over time, 
taking into account past and perhaps expected future health (Brock, Wikler 2005). The latter 
would give special weight to meeting the health needs of those with long-term chronic 
diseases and disabilities along with immunisation programmes. Hence the question that still 
awaits answer is whether special priority should be given to those whose health is not worse 
now but is especially vulnerable to becoming worse (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
This principle of allocation has been rejected for the reason that on top of its failure to take 
into account prognosis, it myopically bases allocation on how sick someone is at the current 
time, a factor that is considered morally arbitrary in genuine scarcity. There is a claim that 
“preferential allocation of a scarce liver to an acutely ill person unjustly ignores a currently 
healthier person with progressive liver disease, who might be worse off when he or she later 
suffers liver failure” (Brock, Wikler 2005). Hence, “favouring those who are currently sickest 
seems to assume that resource scarcity is temporary: that we can save the person who is now 
sickest and then save the progressively ill person later” (Brock, Wikler 2005). This position 
has been emphasised by arguing that even if scarcity were temporary it does not guarantee 
another chance to save the progressively ill person, and that when interventions are 
persistently scarce, saving the progressively ill person later will always involve depriving 
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others. Therefore, “when we cannot save everyone, saving the sickest first is inherently 
flawed and inconsistent with the core idea of priority to the worst-off” (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
Youngest-First criterion 
The title given to this principle can be said to be logically inconsistent with its actual content. 
Strict adherence to this principle’s logical outcome would lead to giving priority to a one-day-
old infant against its twenty-five year old father or mother. But in actual practice, this 
principle gives priority, not to the youngest, but to those who lie in the age in which they have 
higher expectations in life, “with a much more developed personality than the infant, and has 
drawn upon the investment of others to begin as-yet unfulfilled projects” (Brock, Wikler 
2005). Even though some have criticised this principle as age discrimination, there is wide 
acceptance that it is a morally relevant factor in allocating scarce health care resources 
because it gives a chance to the young to experience as much life as the elderly have had. 
Moreover, from an instrumentalist view, those still in the youth bracket are needed for the 
survival of the oldest and the youngest. Hence, for such reasons, youngest-first criterion is 
widely accepted as a relevant moral principle that can be combined with others to decide on 
how fairly the scarce medical and non-medical interventions can be allocated. 
 
But whereas priority to the worst off is attractive to many, there comes up a question of how 
much priority the worst off should receive. It is claimed that “Giving absolute priority to the 
worst off is implausible because it faces the bottomless pit problem—using very great 
amounts of resources to produce very limited or marginal gains in the health-related quality of 
life of the severely ill or disabled. However, there is no apparent principled basis for 
determining how much priority the worst off should receive” (Brock, Wikler 2005:263). 
 
Saving most lives versus life years 
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Some utilitarians who, on top of aiming at maximising health utility, care about distributive 
concerns too, think that achieving the highest aggregate of health benefits from a given 
budget is best possible by saving most lives, irrespective of how long these lives will be 
extended by the intervention. On the contrary, other utilitarians insist that this can best be 
done by looking at the prognosis of the patient and estimating how many more life years will 
be saved or added to the life expectancy of the person who receives the scarce resources. 
Hence, to the former, maximising the number of lives saved is more morally compelling than 
maximising life years. Those who advocate for maximising lives argue, by appealing to 
human to autonomy that, since each life is valuable, this principle seems to need no special 
justification, since, moreover, it avoids comparing individual lives (Brock, Wikler 2005:263).  
Those who are sceptical about fairness in relying on prognosis argue that “Making a well-off 
person’s life better off rather than slightly improving a worse-off person’s life, would be 
unjust” (Brock, Wikler 2005:263). Those who advocate for saving most lives think that it is 
intuitively morally wrong and unfair to, for example, let five people die whose lives would 
have been extended by an average of five years, and give priority to one individual whose life 
will be extended by thirty years. This would be the logical outcome of preferring prognosis or 
life years to saving most lives. Yet on the other extreme, those with aversion for saving most 
lives at the expense of life years are concerned about how much longer these lives can be 
sustained. They think it is unreasonable, for example, to extend those lives, each for a week or 
less, at the expense of extending a life of one individual for several years. 
 
Other than the controversies within the utilitarian principles, when applied at the macro-level 
of health care resource allocation, the theory faces the problem of the relationship between 
aggregation of health benefits and differences in costs (Brock, Wikler 2005:263). This 
controversy has been illustrated in the Oregon health services commission’s decision on 
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whether to prioritise tooth capping for 100 patients or perform appendectomies for a single 
patient (Hadorn 1991).  From the analysis of this case, Brock and Wikler have observed that 
what Oregon’s experience shows is that most people’s sense of priorities is determined by a 
one-to-one comparison of the benefits of different interventions, in which case 
appendectomies are clearly a higher priority than tooth capping. Nord and others have 
revealed from an empirical study, that many people ignore the cost differences because they 
believe that patients should not be at a disadvantage in priority for treatment simply because 
their condition happens to be more expensive to treat than are other patients’ conditions (Nord, 
Richardson, Street, Kuhse, Singer 1995). Further, according to other moral views, 
“individuals should confront other competitors for scarce resources as individuals, and their 
priority for treatment should be determined by the urgency of their individual claims to 
treatment” (Scanlon, 1997). 
 
In the final analysis, “at a minimum, individuals should not be denied very great health 
benefits - in the extreme case, life-saving interventions - merely to provide small health 
benefits to a large number of other persons” (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). 
 
Fair chances and best outcomes 
Related to the maximising principles is what has been called ‘Fair chances and best out 
comes.’ According to this proposal, resources should be targeted at interventions in which 
they will do the most good; hence it ascribes a higher priority to those who can be helped 
more easily or cheaply. “This thinking in turn implies that some patients will lose out simply 
because their needs are more difficult or expensive to meet” (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). In 
their example of 50 pills with two groups of patients (100 and 50 in each group), (Brock, 
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Wikler 2005:264),7  they recommend that to give each patient an equal chance to recover, 
entitlement to treatment should be awarded randomly, even if this decision will result in 17 
less cures. 
 
It has been found out, from empirical studies on the populations’ attitude towards the ‘fair 
chances’ criterion, that there is a negligible difference between health care providers and the 
general public in their attitudes to this conflict. Most health care providers would rather 
favour distribution to one pill patients only, while most members of the general public insist 
that people should not be penalized for needing two pills (Nord 1999).  A division of opinion 
of this kind goes to the heart of QALY or CEA, which is precisely a guide to identifying the 
route to the best outcomes that can be hoped for with existing resources. It also creates a 
dilemma for those health professionals who maintain that health policy should be based on the 
moral values most frequently endorsed by the population affected (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). 
 
Further, it ought to be noted that the conflict between fair chances and best outcomes arises 
not only from differences in the costs of treating otherwise similar groups of patients, but also 
when one group of patients will receive somewhat greater benefits than another at the same 
cost; that the appeal of a ‘fair-chances’ solution is greater when the difference in cost-
effectiveness between the two programs is relatively small compared with the potential gain 
or loss to individual patients (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). Hence, in this case it is implied that if 
the costs are the same and the difference between benefits to the two groups not significant, 
both groups should have equal chances; and if costs are the same and the difference in 
benefits to both groups very significant, then ‘fair chances’ principle can be applied. 
                                                 
7
 The example is a hypothetical case of 100 patients in two groups of 50 each and the clinic having only 50 pills 
to give out. In one group patients require one pill each to recover, while in another group each patient needs two 
pills. To maximise the number of cures using the 50 pills, QALY would recommend that you give the pills to the 
group that need one pill for each patient because in this way you would get the maximum number of cures – 50 
in this case. 
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However, reacting to this proposal it has been argued that giving preference to the most cost-
effective program also seems unjust because it compounds existing unfair inequalities. For 
example: 
Screening slum-dwelling black men for hypertension targets the group with the 
highest incidence and greatest risk of premature death. However, it is more cost-
effective to target well-to-do suburban white men, because they have more ordered 
lives, comply better, have personal doctors and the means to obtain medical services, 
are more educated, and are more likely to modify their lifestyles wisely. However, if 
the poor black men are not screened for this reason, it only compounds their existing 
unjust deprivation and, of course, is also in conflict with giving priority to the worst 
off (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). 
 
Instrumentalist views 
Allocation of scarce medical resources by giving priority on instrumental grounds is taken as 
being pragmatic. “Instrumental value allocation prioritises specific individuals to enable or 
encourage future usefulness” (Brock, Wikler 2005:264). What is mainly considered here are 
two things: what the individual who receives care will contribute towards the well-being of 
others; and rewarding those that made sacrifices for the well-being of others. On this subject, 
Morreim has arguably added that “Responsibility-based allocation - eg, allocation to people 
who agree to improve their health and thus use fewer resources - also represents instrumental 
value allocation” (Morreim 1995:5–12).8 Two suggestions have been made about how to 
incorporate instrumentalist concerns in the allocation of health resources. These are either by 
                                                 
8
 It may be dangerous to accept Morreim’s argument because it is likely to be extended to lead to consideration 
of individual responsibility for sickness. Considering individual responsibility for health condition in priority 
setting is wrong because its acceptance would downgrade almost everyone’s medical attention claim; eg, HIV 
patients, victims of accidents caused by reckless driving, obesity patients, malaria patients (for not sleeping 
under insecticide treated mosquito nets) etc. 
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being forward-looking by promoting social usefulness or backward-looking by rewarding 
social usefulness.  
 
Promoting Social usefulness 
Allocation of health resources based on promoting social usefulness can be said to be the 
most pragmatic criteria for the sake of sustainability of a health system. It gives priority to 
those whose existence is necessary for health care to be possible and sustainable. Emanuel 
and Wertheimer have argued that “Guidelines that prioritise workers producing influenza 
vaccine exemplify instrumental value allocation to save the most lives (Emanuel, Wertheimer 
2006:854–55). Those who favour promoting social usefulness recognise that although this 
principle is insufficient on its own, “all those whose continued existence is clearly required so 
that others might live have a good claim to priority. Prioritising essential healthcare staff does 
not treat them as counting for more in themselves, but rather prioritises them to benefit others 
(Persad et al, 2009).  
 
Rewarding social usefulness 
On the part of rewarding social usefulness, those who propose this principle argue that 
“justice as reciprocity calls for providing something in return for contributions that people 
have made”( Macklin 2004). But whereas this criterion may be out-rightly endorsed, what 
may be most controversial is its extent: that is, what kind and amount of sacrifice would be 
enough and relevant to warrant preferential treatment? Whereas some think that organ donors 
alone qualify out-rightly, or even blood donors, others claim that others, for example, war 
veterans who took life-threatening risks to avoid disasters that might moreover impose a 
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heavy toll on a health system, and directly saved other peoples’ lives, should also qualify on 
the reciprocity ticket (Brock, Wikler 2005).9 
 
Allocation by ‘Need’ 
Yet another controversy has arisen about ‘need’ as a morally relevant criterion in allocating 
health care services. According to this principle, those with the greatest medical needs should 
be given priority. But whereas many might sympathise with this principle, there is wide 
disagreement on what counts as ‘need’. In the strongest advocacy possible for this criterion, 
the Sir John Toby, as quoted by Cookson and Dolan, has stated that: “We don’t believe there 
should be discrimination on any grounds other than on clinical need” (Cookson Dolan 2000). 
Against this position, however, “unless the concept of “clinical need” is clearly defined using 
substantive criteria, this principle reduces it to the rather unpalatable procedural principle that 
any rationing decision must be correct so long as a clinician has taken it” (Cookson, Dolan 
2000).  Hence, number of attempts have been made to define ‘need’ in relation to health care 
entitlement. Whereas some define need as ill health, others argue that in defining the concept 
of ‘need’ capabilities of patients’ to benefit from an intervention should take precedence in 
determining the patients’ degree of need. 
 
Need as ill health 
Three ways have been proposed on how to define ‘need as ill health.’ One way to define 
‘medical need’ has been by reference to the extent of one’s ill-health. “For example, it can be 
argued that an immediate threat to life (for example, within the next year or so) is the most 
urgent and pressing form of ill health, and that saving (or prolonging) life should almost 
                                                 
9
 Taking this principle to its logical conclusion, priority would automatically extend to the rich, those who are 
productive and generate money for the economy because this money is needed for the purchase of the needed 
technology and other medical supplies. Hence, once endorsed as a morally relevant this principle may lead to the 
bottomless pit problem of who should receive priority. 
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always take priority over enhancing life” (Harris  1985). “A second, broader definition of need 
as ill health would encompass immediate pain and suffering (…) as well as immediate threat 
to life” (Cookson, Dolan 2000). Hence, this means that “Need can be interpreted as the 
individual’s immediate degree of ill health” (Gillon 1986). Yet, another possibility of defining 
need as ill health has been proposed to consider looking at the individual’s whole lifetime of 
ill health rather than just his or her immediate situation (for example, ill health in the next 
year or so) (Cookson, Dolan 2000). 
 
Need as Capability to benefit from treatment 
The underlying argument of this principle, though not explicitly stated in most cases, is that, 
the clinically ill persons without chances of benefiting from the medical intervention available 
have no medical need! These are of course motivated by the maximising principles – that the 
higher the capacity to earn more QALYs, the greater and urgent the medical need.  
 
The WHO’s preferred criterion for allocation of scarce health resources between equally sick 
groups or individuals is each group’s capacity to benefit from treatment. According to this 
principle, “If A and B are equally ill and both can be cured, but A at a lower cost than B, then 
A has a greater capacity to benefit than B” (Nord 2000). The same question arises in ‘Fair 
chances and best outcomes’. On the contrary, however, this principle is rejected and instead a 
direct opposite of the above position especially for the developing countries where resource 
scarcity is most severe, has been suggested. The reason given for this is to give all patients a 
reason to hope that their health needs will be met, and strict adherence to cost effectiveness 
criterion could result in large numbers of patients with serious and life-threatening health 
needs having no hope that their needs will be met (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
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Generally, the bottom line is that of the above-discussed ethical principles, no single principle 
on its own can be relied on to ensure a just allocation of health care services. A number of 
them must be combined, taking into account special circumstances. Given the various 
competing health care systems’ goals especially efficiency and equity, and the fact that it is 
sometimes impossible to achieve both because of the scarcity of resources, it can be 
concluded that “... priority-setting necessarily implies a degree of trading-off between 
different health system goals, such that the most equitable allocation of resources is highly 
unlikely to be the most efficient allocation” (Hutubessy et al.; 2003). And arguing along the 
same line, it has been shown that “A sequential analysis of these competing criteria, however, 
indicates that for the allocation of public funds, priority should be given to cost effective 
interventions that are public goods (have no market) and impose high spill-over effects or 
catastrophic costs particularly in relation to the poor, [if left unsolved]” (Hutubessy et al 
2003).  
 
Part II 
The Complete lives system 
In part one of this chapter I have discussed the various ethical principles that have been 
suggested to govern the allocation of scarce health resources by taking distributional concerns 
into consideration. From the analysis it has been seen that even though these moral principles 
are morally valid and compelling, none of them is enough on its own to take care of all 
relevant ethical values that ought to be considered in a fair distribution of scarce health 
resources, yet others may be considered morally irrelevant. It is for this reason that Persad et 
al have suggested an alternative approach to the allocation of scarce health resources, called 
the complete lives system.   
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The complete lives system approach is based on the fact that at present, none of  the available 
systems for allocating health care resources satisfy all ethical requirements for just allocation. 
The complete lives system is not radically opposed to the ethical principles discussed in part 
on of this chapter. Instead it is a recommendation that a combination of them be used to 
ensure a fair and efficient allocation of health resources. According to its proponents, it 
incorporates five of the above-discussed ethical principles: youngest-first, prognosis, save the 
most lives, lottery, and instrumental value (Persad et al 2009). 
 
The complete lives system “prioritises younger people who have not yet lived a complete life 
and will be unlikely to do so without aid” (Persad et al 2009). Persad et al., claim that thinkers 
have accepted complete lives as the appropriate focus of distributive justice, shifting attention 
to “individual human lives, rather than individual experiences, as the units over which any 
distributive principle should operate in health care rationing policy (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
Further, “although there are important differences between these thinkers, they share a core 
commitment to consider entire lives rather than events or episodes, which is also the defining 
feature of the complete lives system” (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
Whereas taken to its logical outcome youngest-first principle would lead to the absurdity of 
allocating resources to infants than the youthful adults, ‘complete lives system’ modifies this 
principle to the avoidance of such an absurdity. Consideration of the importance of complete 
lives also supports modifying the youngest-first principle by prioritising adolescents and 
young adults over infants. This modification to favour the youth is based on the fact that 
“adolescents have received substantial education, parental care and investments that will be 
wasted without a complete life. Infants, by contrast, have not yet received these investments. 
Similarly, adolescence brings with it a developed personality capable of forming and valuing 
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long-term plans whose fulfilment requires a complete life” (Brock, Wikler 2005). According 
to the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, (1993), “It is terrible when an infant dies, but worse, 
most people think, when a three-year-old child dies and worse still when an adolescent dies.  
 
Further, realising that justification of youngest-first criterion being based on the amount of 
resources society has already put in this group may lead to giving priority to those with 
affluent backgrounds because they will have received more resources at that age, it is argued 
that the justification for modifying the complete lives systems to favour the youth does not 
lead to such a conclusion. Instead, “the prioritisation of adolescents and young adults 
considers the social and personal investment that people are morally entitled to have received 
at a particular age, rather than accepting the results of an unjust status quo. Consequently, 
poor adolescents should be treated the same way as wealthy ones, even though they may have 
received less investment owing to social injustice” (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
 Another relevant principle that defines the complete lives system is consideration of 
prognosis.  The reason for this is its aim which is to achieve complete lives – hence, it would 
be relentless and morally unfortunate to expend society resources on individuals that would 
never achieve complete lives. For example, a young adult with a poor prognosis, who has had 
few life-years but lacks the potential to live a complete life can not receive priority. Hence, 
this principle too is not taken for granted. Therefore, “considering prognosis forestalls the 
concern that disproportionately large amounts of resources will be directed to young people 
with poor prognoses. When the worst-off can benefit only slightly, while better-off people 
could benefit greatly, allocating to the better-off is often justifiable (Rawls 1999; Parfit 1997). 
Some small benefits, such as a few weeks of life, might also be intrinsically insignificant 
when compared with large benefits” (Kamm 1993). 
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The saving the most lives principle is also part of the complete lives system. This principle, 
according to Persad et al, is also included in this system for the reason that enabling more 
people to live complete lives is better than enabling fewer (Kamm 1993; McKie, Richardson 
2005).   
 
Instrumentalist considerations are also suggested to be part of the complete lives system. 
Instrumentalist considerations are supported in the allocation of health resources because of 
the idea that in public health emergencies, instrumental values are necessary to enable more 
people to live complete lives. It is indeed reasonable enough that the health care staff be given 
priority because the ultimate logical out come of denying them priority, is that no one else 
would receive health care. 
 
Finally, lotteries are also believed to lead to justice in that allocation of scarce resources in 
some contexts. To ensure that small differences in the degree of ill-health does not lead to 
unfair choices between the affected parties, Persad et al agree with Howard (2001) and 
Schwappach (2002) that lotteries be used when making choices between roughly equal 
recipients, and also potentially to ensure that no individual—irrespective of age or 
prognosis—is seen as beyond saving.  
 
According to Persad et al., the proponents of this suggestion, the complete lives system is yet 
complete in another way: it incorporates each morally relevant simple principle. When 
implemented, the complete lives system is said to produce a priority curve on which 
individuals aged between roughly 15 and 40 years get the most substantial chance, whereas 
the youngest and oldest people get chances that are attenuated. Even though the resulting 
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figure from the complete lives system resembles the one from the proposal made by DALY 
advocates; the latter justifies preference to younger people because of priority to the worst-off, 
while the former does so because of priority to the instrumental value. Further, the complete 
lives system assumes that, “although life-years are equally valuable to all, justice requires the 
fair distribution of them. Conversely, DALY allocation treats life-years given to elderly or 
disabled people as objectively less valuable” (Brock, Wikler 2005). 
 
Finally, according to those who favour this suggestion, basing on its formulation they argue 
that the complete lives system is least vulnerable to corruption. It is not easy to manipulate 
because age can be established quickly and accurately from identity documents. Further still, 
allocation based on prognosis encourages physicians to improve patients’ health, unlike the 
perverse incentives to sicken patients or misrepresent health that the sickest-first allocation 
creates (Persad et al 2009). 
 
Objections to the complete lives system 
The complete lives system has not passed without criticism, and yet, vehemently defended 
from these criticisms by its advocates. The first criticism levelled against the complete lives 
system is that it discriminates against older people. In this case, age-based allocation is seen 
as ageism. But in response to this criticism, Persad et al, argue that “Unlike allocation by sex 
or race, allocation by age is not invidious discrimination; every person lives through different 
life stages rather than being a single age” (Persad et al 2009). They add that “Even if 25-year-
olds receive priority over 65-year-olds, everyone who is 65 years now was previously 25 
years” (Persad et al 2009). Hence, they argue treating 65-year-olds differently because of 
stereotypes or falsehoods would be ageist; treating them differently because they have already 
had more life-years is not. 
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Further, they respond to the attack on the complete lives system for its alleged insensitivity to 
international differences in typical lifespan. The critics of the complete lives system argue that 
“Although broad consensus favours adolescents over very young infants, and young adults 
over the very elderly people, implementation can reasonably differ between, even within, 
nation-states. On the contrary, however, Persad et al., argue that this criticism is based on the 
belief that a complete life is a universal limit founded in natural human capacities, which 
everyone should accept even without scarcity. Instead, they explain and recommend that, the 
complete lives system requires only that citizens see a complete life, howsoever defined, as an 
important good, and accept that fairness gives those short of a complete life, stronger claims 
to scarce life-saving resources (Persad et al 2009). 
 
In his disagreement with the complete lives system, Arras has argued that principles must be 
ordered lexically: less important principles should come into play only when more important 
ones are fulfilled (Arras 2005). To counter this objection, Persad et al., appeal to Rawls’ 
rejection of this lexical priority as inappropriate when distributing specific resources in 
society, though appropriate for ordering the principles of basic social justice that shape the 
distribution of basic rights, opportunities, and income (Rawls 1971).  
 
One more attack against the complete lives system by Lecker and Pearlman, (1989) on one 
hand and Lanken (Lanken, Terry, Osborne 1997) on the other, is that its acceptance would be 
premature for health care because there is need to reduce waste first, and then increase 
spending later. However, as already seen, “complete lives system explicitly rejects waste and 
corruption, such as multiple listing for transplantation. Although it may be applicable more 
generally, the complete lives system has been developed to justly allocate persistently scarce 
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life-saving interventions” Persad et al 2009). They argue, in agreement with Evans, that hearts 
for transplant and influenza vaccines, unlike money, cannot be replaced or diverted to non-
health goals; denying a heart to one person makes it available to another. Ultimately, the 
complete lives system does not create “classes of Untermenschen whose lives and well being 
are deemed not worth spending money on” (Evans 1997), but rather empowers us to decide 
fairly whom to save when genuine scarcity makes saving everyone impossible (Persad et al 
2009). 
 
By and large, the complete lives system is motivated by the ineffectiveness of the individual 
substantive principles since none of them recognises all morally relevant values, and some 
recognise irrelevant ones. QALY and DALY multi-principle systems neglect the importance 
of fair distribution (Brock, Wikler 2005). The complete lives system combines five morally 
relevant principles: youngest-first, prognosis, lottery, and saving the most lives. In pandemic 
situations, it also allocates scarce interventions to people instrumental in realising these four 
principles. Importantly, it is a framework that expresses widely affirmed values such as 
priority to the worst-off, maximising benefits, and treating people equally. But as seen above, 
the complete lives system too is not a set of perfect criteria. Ultimately the complete lives 
system too is believed to have some internal flaws. And it is for this reason that there has been 
a suggestion to the effect that the discussion and consideration of these numerous and 
controversial ethical principles for purposes of health resource allocation is likely to be 
relenting and lead to no universally and unequivocal recommendation on this subject. 
Therefore it has been thought as easy, to devise a system that will help bypass these 
controversial principles, even a combination of them (the complete lives system). This 
suggestion is the Fair Procedures approach, discussed below.  
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Part III 
The Fair Procedures Approach 
An alternative to the controversial substantive moral principles and the consequent complete 
lives system proposal in the allocation of scarce health care interventions has been suggested. 
This new suggestion purports to avoid the controversy that surrounds the substantive 
principles by establishing ‘fair procedures’ that would guide policy makers in choosing the 
most rational and fair pattern of allocating the scarce medical interventions. This has been 
enshrined in what has been named ‘Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R).’ In favour of 
A4R, Norman Daniels has controversially argued that “Accountability for reasonableness 
establishing a fair process for priority setting is easier than agreeing on principles” (Daniels 
2000). The reason that is offered for this claim is that, in pluralist societies we are likely to 
find reasonable disagreements about principles that should govern priority setting. Making 
reference to the disagreements on the substantive principles, he exemplifies that whereas 
“some will want to give more priority to the worst off, some less; some will be willing to 
aggregate benefits in ways that others are not [willing to do]” (Daniels 2000). Hence the 
argument is that “in the absence of a consensus on principles, a fair process allows us to agree 
on what is legitimate and fair” (Daniels 2000). 
According to this suggestion, four general conditions can ensure Accountability for 
Reasonableness. The belief about these general conditions is that once they are met, they will 
lead health plan enrollees, patients, and the public to respect the fairness and legitimacy of 
decisions by managed care organizations and public officials regarding coverage of new 
technologies and treatments (Daniels 2005:228-248). Generally, the four principles are 
summarised as follows: 
Publicity: Decisions [regarding rationing] and their underlying rationales must be publicly 
accessible. 
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Relevance: These rationales must rest on evidence, reasons, and principles that plan managers, 
clinicians, patients, and consumers agree are pertinent to deciding how to meet diverse needs 
under resource restraints. 
Revisability and appeals: A mechanism must allow challenges to limit-setting decisions, help 
resolve those challenges, and allow revisions in light of further evidence and arguments. 
Enforcement: A voluntary or public regulatory process must ensure that decision makers fulfil 
the first three conditions (Daniels 2005:228-248). 
The above conditions, in Daniels view, “can convert behind-the-scenes deliberations by 
public agencies and private health plans into a public - and ultimately democratic  deliberation 
concerning how limited resources might best be used to maintain the health of populations 
with diverse service needs” (Daniels 2005:228-248).  The other advantage with ‘fair 
procedures’ has been said to be that “A culture of openness would also facilitate learning 
among clinicians and enrollees about the need for limits on health care coverage” (Daniels 
2005:228-248). Further, many people claim that the litigious public will accept no limits and 
the solution therefore is to change that culture through a concerted educational effort both 
outside and inside these institutions that deliver and finance care. If this project is to succeed, 
it is believed that this “Education must begin with openness about the reasons for decisions by 
public and private health providers and insurers. Over time, this process can spur broader 
deliberation by a public better educated to think about how to share medical resources fairly 
and its elected officials” (Daniels 2005:228-248) 
 
Publicity: The suggestion of Fair Procedures is based on the premise that always, “a fair 
process requires publicity about the reasons and rationales that play a part in decisions. There 
must be no secrets where justice is involved, for people should not be expected to accept 
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decisions that affect their well being unless they are aware of the grounds for those decisions” 
(Daniels 2000).  In Peter Singer et al’s empirical study on ‘priority setting for new 
technologies in medicine’, it was found that transparency was important to participants in the 
decisions. This broader transparency was concluded to be a hallmark of fair process (Singer et 
al 2000). But against this alleged logic between justice and publicity, a question may be asked: 
Is what makes a decision fair the fact that it has been publicized, or the fact that that decision 
is fair in itself? Even though publicity may be defended from the point of the patients’ right to 
information, it can not be every type of information, much less if that information is likely to 
erode public ‘trust’ in the health system. I will pursue this point later. 
 
Relevance: As a measure against what has been raised against the substantive moral 
principles that the Fair Procedures suggestion tries to overcome, those who advocate for the 
Fair Procedures proposal caution that fair process must also involve constraints on reasons. 
The argument is that “Fair minded people—those who seek mutually justifiable grounds for 
cooperation, must agree that the reasons, evidence, and rationales are relevant to meeting 
population health needs fairly, the shared goal of deliberation” (Daniels 2000).  
 
Revisability and appeals: On the need for the revision and appeals mechanisms it is suggested 
that “Fair process also requires opportunities to challenge and revise decisions in light of the 
kinds of considerations all stakeholders may raise” (Daniels 2005:228-248). 
By and large, ‘Accountability for reasonableness’ is seen as a strategy of making possible the 
education of all stakeholders on the substance of transparency in deliberation about fair 
decisions under resource constraints. It facilitates social learning about limits. It connects 
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decision making in health care institutions to broader, more fundamental democratic 
deliberative processes (Daniels 2005:228-248). Hence, it has been suggested that, since we 
may not be able to construct principles that yield fair decisions ahead of time, we need a 
process that allows us to develop those reasons over time as we face real cases; and that the 
social learning that this approach facilitates provides our best prospect of achieving agreement 
over sharing medical resources fairly (Daniels 2005:228-248). 
A critical reflection on the Fair Procedures proposal 
No doubt that the proposal of fair procedures established through Accountability for 
Reasonableness is appealing, mainly due to its motivation: that is, to ensure openness, 
transparency, justification and enforcement of what has been agreed on. However appealing 
this proposal seems at a glance, it has not passed without very serious challenges. The first 
challenge points to the complexity involved in its ‘revision and appeals’ condition on one 
hand, the second one to its being circular, and third is its alleged compatibility with both the 
‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ rationing. 
Controversies and contradictions 
Highlighting the challenges that will face the ‘fair procedures’ proposal, particularly the 
condition of ‘revision and appeals’, Sabik, Lie (2008) have considered a number of empirical 
examples. One among such examples is that of Norway’s Patients’ Rights Charter in relation 
to patients’ autonomy. Although in principle the patients have a right and means to appeal 
against decisions that deny them certain treatment, in practice these means are more limited 
than they ought to be according to Daniels and Sabin’s proposal. A critical analysis of 
Norway’s example “demonstrates that an appeals procedure that satisfies the Daniels–Sabin 
appeal condition, is still controversial” (Sabik, Lie 2008). “But more importantly, the choices 
we face when we want to make it more specific cases reveal that we need to make it more 
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specific reveal we need to make choices about the underlying conflict between patient 
interests and cost containment and about the substantive principles that are implemented in 
this particular system (Sabik, Lie 2008).  
Against Daniel’s hope of avoiding reference to the substantive principles, they reiterate that 
still “Reasonable people will disagree about exactly how one should strike a balance between 
these competing substantive concerns … [because] different specific appeal procedures are 
justified by competing substantive principles” (Sabik, Lie 2008). By this very argument it is 
shown that Daniels and Sabin will find it extremely hard to avoid addressing the conflicts 
between principles that the procedural account was supposed to make unnecessary since 
different specific appeal procedures are justified by competing substantive principles, (Sabik, 
Lie 2008).  In a nutshell, they conclude that: 
Concerns for procedural justice should continue to play a central role in making limit-setting 
decisions about health care. Discussion of substantive principles that underlie decisions should 
be of equal concern, though. The consideration of appropriate principles cannot be left aside 
and replaced entirely with a procedural account that does not specifically address the 
underlying principles. An increased awareness of the need to address both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of priority setting, in part by including relevant parties early on in 
discussions about priorities, may lead to decisions that are legitimate and minimize 
disagreement among those involved, (Sabik, Lie 2008). 
 
‘Fair Procedures’ and the case of implicit/explicit rationing and Trust 
Accountability for reasonableness is claimed to occupy a middle ground in the debate 
between those calling for “explicit” and “implicit” rationing. Those who share this opinion 
argue that “Like implicit approaches, the ‘fair procedures’ approach does not require that 
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principles for rationing be made explicit ahead of time. But, like explicit approaches, it does 
call for transparency about reasoning that all can eventually agree is relevant” (Daniels 2000).  
The strongest reason for implicit rationing is to maintain public trust in the system by 
ensuring that patients do not get to know how they are normally weighted against others. This 
being the case, therefore, the ‘fair procedures approach’ as seen in Accountability for 
Reasonableness’ is likely to find challenges in maintaining trust in a health system. Trust, 
though not discussed widely in most health care literature, is very crucial. It has been 
contended that in fact it would be useless if the health care system were just, yet the 
population do not ‘trust’ that it is. It is true that “trust in any system holds it together 
especially in the face of economic and other tensions, and in its absence, mechanisms of 
needed control are expensive, burdensome, and uncertain, [as seen in the problems that arise 
in the appeals procedures]. Trust in an important sense is a substitute for a cumbersome 
regulatory bureaucracy” (Mechanic 1995).   
 
This challenge (trust) arises in the choice between explicit and implicit rationing approaches. 
Under implicit rationing, only health care staff would know why they allocate resources the 
way they do. It would also, on top of adhering to certain agreed upon moral principles, 
involve a lot of discretion on the part of the health care providers on how to set priorities 
among their patients and different populations. Conversely, the explicit rationing approach 
would involve setting precise procedures for rationing ahead of time and making them known 
to the public as the ‘fair procedures’ condition of publicity demands. And in this case, the 
discretion of the health care providers would be done away with since strict adherence to the 
set rules, which are well known by all their clients, would be expected.  
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Whereas many would agree to the patients’ right to information and transparency of the health 
care system, much of the information discussed and implemented in health care rationing 
discourse is likely to erode public trust in the system, (Mechanic 1995), especially when 
patients are most likely to be on the losing end, as the Sabik and Lie’s Norway’s example 
implies. An interest in making rationing criteria explicit arises from the illusion that 
optimisation is possible, by arriving at perfect and uncontroversial principles that balance 
equity with efficiency. In the view of Mechanic, an implicit rationing embedded in an 
appropriate value framework offers the best among admittedly imperfect alternatives of 
competing criteria (Mechanic 1995).  
 
Obviously, there are problems with implicit rationing; for example the likelihood of abuse 
health professionals’ discretion. Even though this may be the case, still implicit rationing is 
the best solution because it reduces tensions arising from scarcity by taking into account the 
determination of people to receive a particular procedure (Mechanic1995).  Further, the 
explicit rationing procedure is not fully responsive to people’s perceived and real needs 
because it inevitably gives preference to some who care less about treatment than others who 
are excluded. “Thus it results in many disaffected people who are a continuing force 
challenging either the rules of allocation or decisions to withhold greater investment in the 
area” (Mechanic 1995).  In Mechanic’s view, generally, 
 
Implicit rationing, despite its imperfections, is more conducive to stable social 
relations and a lower level of conflict. It is doubtful that tough systems of explicit 
rationing can be maintained, except during crises such as war, without focusing 
conflict and destabilising the medical care system. Explicit rationing is also likely to 
confront government and the political process with unrelenting agitation for budget 
increases (Mechanic1995). 
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It has further been contended that, for example, since in many ‘for profit health maintenance 
organisations’ a large proportion of the doctor's earnings depends on meeting expected cost 
targets, (Hillman 1987:1743-8) most patients are uncomfortable with the idea that their doctor 
must balance their needs against the needs of others and cost-cutting (Mechanic, Ettel, Davis 
1990:14-23). And “If patients truly knew the extent of developing conflicts of interest built 
into existing financial and organisational arrangements, their trust would be very much 
diminished (Mechanic, Ettel, Davis, 199014-23). Differences made too explicit are likely to 
lead to resentments and conflicts. Thus, though it is possible to have an informal 
understanding that the same vigour of intervention for the sick old and younger patients is 
inappropriate, making the policy explicit on how priority is set between them, and then 
applying such a policy uniformly will inevitably result in acrimony difficult to manage 
politically (Mechanic, Ettel, Davis1990:14-23). 
 
Conclusion 
By and large, like the case with the theory of utilitarianism and its consequent QALY 
approach, the above-discussed allocation principles do not provide a universally accepted 
solution to the dilemmas faced in allocation of health interventions in a fair and efficient 
manner. But whereas for pragmatic reason we may tentatively endorse a system like the 
complete lives system because of its comparatively better attempt to balance efficiency and 
distributive justice, more investigation needs to done. However, the question that now 
remains unanswered is whether, after the said investigation, that resulting perfect 
harmonisation of the substantive allocation principles and QALY approach per se would 
guarantee health equity in Uganda. This seems very unlikely because the discourse on 
harmonising QALY approach and the popular ethical principles of allocation is based on the 
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material conditions on the Western world which are very different from those in Uganda. For 
that matter, the discourse seems to ignore special circumstances in Uganda – Poverty and its 
influence on health equity. This is the issue I want to briefly reflect upon as a beginning of my 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
In chapter one I have made three points. In the first place I have argued that Uganda is 
severely deprived of its moral entitlement to good health care services and this is because of 
the severe scarcity of resources available to the health sector. I have further shown that   this 
form of injustice is worsened by the unequal distribution of the burdens and benefits of the 
system and this arrangement disproportionately negatively affects the poor. I indicated that 
from real priority setting practices in Uganda and the implementation there lacks 
systematicity in this endeavour. And for that matter there seems to be no hope that there will 
be equity in health in the near future, if nothing is done to change the situation.  
 
In chapter two, I have shown that the theory of utilitarianism is so far widely used in the 
allocation of health resources in what is popularly known as QALY maximisation in health. I 
have done this by discussing the various tools and methods to arrive at the final QALYs and 
this has revealed that all these promote utilitarian principles of utility maximisation. I have 
argued that there is nothing inherently wrong with health benefit maximisation in situations of 
severe scarcity of resources, except if this maximisation jeopardises other equally compelling 
moral considerations – such as distributive justice, in the allocation of health resources. I have 
proved the morality of using QALYs in health resource allocation in a brief justification. I 
have gone ahead to show that, even though there is a morally valid and sound argument for 
using QALYs in health resource allocation, it is not enough to base allocations on maximising 
principles. I have shown this by presenting some challenges that face QALY approach and 
these are concerned with distributive justice.  
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In chapter three I have discussed other moral principles suggested to guide health resource 
allocation as supplements to the QALY approach. I have shown that of the many suggested 
principles, no single principle is enough to take care of all relevant ethical values that need to 
be considered in the allocation of health resources in order to balance equity with efficiency. I 
have further shown that even the complete lives system, though it is a very good step towards 
balancing equity and efficiency, it still has some challenges to overcome. Finally I discussed 
another suggestion for ensuring justice in health resource allocation, called the Fair 
Procedures approach which is enshrine in what is called Accountability for Reasonableness. I 
have argued that this project is implausible without making reference to the discussion of the 
substantial ethical principles that it seeks to make unnecessary, and also the complexity in its 
‘appeals procedure’. 
 
In this conclusion, I wish to reiterate the point that, all in all, in situations of severe scarcity it 
is a good idea that health systems achieve the highest possible health benefits from the scarce 
resources at their disposal, although this is not the only important value of the health system. 
Hence, equity concerns should be used to mitigate efficiency’s extremism and the resulting 
injustice. However, I argue that in the case of Uganda, even though it is important that the 
dilemmas regarding the discussed principles be resolved, this is still not enough to achieve 
equity. The reason is that the whole discourse on these moral principles, seem to be based on 
a subtle and yet wrong assumption that all health services are financed by the public sector, 
and therefore the only thing needed to achieve equity is sharing those resources equitably. I 
emphasise that, even though balancing health benefit maximisation with fairness in the 
distribution of the available public resources is good, this is not good enough to guarantee 
equity in Uganda. The reason is that the discourse misses out on the fundamental cause of 
health inequities in Uganda, which is poverty and the financing mechanism used in the system. 
 115 
Hence, it is necessary to focus on the needs of the financially poor because they are 
disproportionately adversely affected in the current system, by spending a large proportion of 
their income on health. I conclude that, developing an equitable financing of the health care 
system which takes into consideration the needs of the poor should therefore be a key priority.  
Before making my final conclusion, I will first make a point about the relationship between 
poverty and inequity in health and how this is missed in the QALY approach, the substantive 
ethical principles, and the fair procures approach. It is this point that will build the case for the 
conclusion that, ignoring the issue of poverty in addressing inequity in health, and instead 
turning the whole attention to the discussion of QALY approach and principles would be 
good, but not good enough to ensure health equity in Uganda. 
 
Poverty and inequity in health 
As opposed to what the ‘separate spheres view’ advocates argue, as earlier seen, there is need 
to consider the needs of the poor in the way health care is rationed. According to the ‘separate 
spheres view’, for the purpose of health resource allocation based on priority to the worst-off, 
poverty is an irrelevant factor in the allocation of health resources, particularly in the 
definition of who the worst off are. On the contrary, generally in the developing world, 
inequity in health is caused and worsened by factors related to poverty. Some of these 
poverty-related factors are: unequal access to health care, unequal chances of being ill or 
healthy between social groups, unequal distribution of the incidence of the burden of disease 
and unequal distribution of the social consequences of ill health such as poverty which leads 
back to ill-health, leading to a vicious circle of ill-health and poverty. All these features of 
health inequity work against the poor members of society. Hence, there is a strong spiral 
causal relationship between poverty and inequity in health. 
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In Health for some: ..., it has been argued that, “When someone has no choice in his living or 
working conditions, then any resulting ill-health or lack of informed access to potential 
remedies can be judged unfair” (Edejer 2010). Hence, “equity in health thus implies a 
society’s commitment to individuals’ being equally capable of achieving good health 
outcomes and is conditional on respecting the diversity and autonomy of these individuals and 
achieved through taking action for the health of unfairly disadvantaged people [especially the 
poor] (Edejer 2010). 
 
When it comes to the incidence of the burden of disease generally, it has been found that 
despite the limitations of proxy data in measuring inequity, there is a compelling picture of 
the widespread prevalence of inequities in health against the poor. This is revealed in the 
reanalysis of the 1990 Global Burden of Disease data which showed that communicable 
diseases cause 47.3% of deaths and 49.8% of disability-adjusted life years’ (DALY) loss 
shouldered by the poorest 20% of the population, whereas the richest 20% bear only 4.2% of 
deaths and 2.6% of DALY loss caused by communicable disease. Other health indicators 
show differentials of 2- to 10-fold between rich and poor (Edejer 2010). 
 
Further, the effects of poverty on the health of individuals can easily be ascribed to its social 
consequences in feelings of risk, powerlessness, vulnerability due to inability to afford health 
care, and low self-esteem, as well as to the absolute effect of material deprivation. All these 
phenomena deepen the levels of inequity in health between social classes especially between 
the rich and the poor. It is noted also that according to empirical evidence not only the 
incomes of individuals but also the distribution of their incomes within a society affects their 
health. Thus, in addition to the absolute impact of material deprivation, a socioeconomic 
gradient has an independent effect on health. Some have advanced the loss of social capital 
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(the cohesion and solidarity of a society) as a plausible mechanism to explain many 
deleterious health effects (Edejer 2010). 
 
The available evidence on the impact of illness and health care costs at household level 
clearly demonstrates that the most vulnerable households face enormous constraints in 
accessing care when they are required to pay user fees, particularly where geographic access 
is poor and other costs of treatment seeking are high (e.g. for transport). With the high levels 
of poverty throughout Uganda, household livelihoods are so fragile that if a member needs to 
use health services and pay fees at the time of service (whether to a public or private provider), 
the household may have to take actions to access cash that could lead to further 
impoverishment. 
 
It has been evident so far that out-of-pocket payment for health care has disastrous 
consequences for the poor as far as access to health care services is concerned (Mclntyre et al 
2008:871–876). The evidence about the adverse consequences of user fees for households’ 
livelihoods is so overwhelming that even the arch protagonist of user fees in the 1980s and 
1990s, the World Bank, has acknowledged that “Out-of-pocket payments for health services – 
especially hospital care – can make the difference between a household being poor or not” 
(Claeson et al 2001). For that matter it has been indicated that alternative financing 
mechanisms may be preferable. As a result of all this, there have been growing calls for 
removal of user fees at public sector facilities in Africa, particularly at the primary care level. 
Whereas Uganda has adhered to the call of scraping user fees in all government health 
facilities, this has yet engendered other challenges that have kept health inequities unchanged 
and seemingly going worse since lack of essential medicines in public facilities is worsening 
and reliance on the private sector is on the increase. 
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The missing link 
The above discussed approach and substantive ethical principles of allocation miss out on one 
crucial issue that Uganda needs to address in order to reduce inequity in health, to the extent 
that a discourse on them alone can never guarantee health equity in Uganda. This missing link 
is the effect of poverty and wide income inequalities on equity in health. And amidst these 
two (poverty and income inequality), 50% of health services are financed out-of-pocket by 
households. Therefore ensuring equitable allocation of the available public health budget 
resources per se will not be enough to achieve equity, since the poor can not afford to pay the 
50% for health care services which are not covered by the state.  
 
The QALY approach is entirely concerned with maximising health benefits from the scarce 
resources at the public’s disposal and nothing more. On the other hand, other substantive 
allocation principles are more concerned with how equitable is the distribution of the scarce 
resources at the disposal of the public sector as if this is the only health-financing mechanism 
all systems rely on. Very limited efforts, if any, are made towards exploring the fundamental 
causes of inequity in health especially in developing countries where there is a lot out-of-
pocket financing of health services- even the basic ones. This confirms the fact that in all 
these approaches and principles there is an implicit, yet wrong assumption, that all health care 
received by the population is financed by the public sector and there is no payment of user-
fees or any other form of out-of-pocket financing of health services. It is this assumption that 
may lead to a wrong conclusion that a just health system is one that justly allocates public 
resources, implying that this is the only determinant of equity in health. 
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Hence, the key issue that is missed in these approaches is how poverty and health care 
financing mechanisms affect equity in health care, especially in a developing country like 
Uganda. The consequence of all this is that the needs of the financially poor are ignored as 
well as the financial consequences of disease to the poor. All this leads to a vicious circle of 
ill-health from lack of access to health services, catastrophic payments for health services that 
plunge households into poverty, and then poverty leading to ill-health again. This situation 
steepens the health gradient between the rich and the poor. Hence, considering the situation in 
most developing countries (Uganda) there is need to pay attention health care financing and 
its impact on equity. 
 
Recommendations 
Currently Uganda is faced with great constraints and challenges in relation to health care 
financing. This has caused and worsened inequities in health. For that matter, therefore: 
 
 Basing on the perspective of pursuing financing mechanisms and schemes that will 
improve equity and alleviate poverty, rather than contribute to further impoverishment 
of vulnerable households thereby mitigating inequity in health, there is need to devise 
new financing mechanisms that will take into account the financial needs of the poor. 
 
 These schemes must guarantee financial protection, i.e. should ensure that no one who 
needs health services is denied access due to inability to pay and households’ 
livelihoods should not be endangered by the costs of accessing health services. To 
make this possible health, care financing contributions should be separated from 
service utilisation, which requires some form of pre-payment.  
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 Health care financing contributions should be distributed according to ability-to-pay. 
In particular, progressive health care financing mechanisms (i.e. where those with 
greater ability-to-pay contribute a higher proportion of their income than those with 
lower incomes) should be prioritised. 
 
 Cross-subsidies in the overall health system should be promoted.  
 
 Strategies to ensure that financial resources are translated into universal access to 
health services should be devised. This means that all individuals should be entitled to 
benefit from health services through one of the funding mechanisms in place 
 
Conclusion 
The Uganda health system, like all health systems outlines efficiency and equity, as the most 
important aims that will guide the allocation of health resources. Although the main aim of 
this work was, in the final analysis, to explore the possibility of ensuring justice in health care 
in Uganda, part of the concern of the concern has been on balancing concerns of equity and 
efficiency. This is because ‘goodness’ and ‘fairness’ are the two most robust aims of all health 
systems. Hence, as regards the choice between promoting equity or efficiency, it is not a 
better choice to sacrifice the fairness objective (justice/equity) for goodness (efficiency) 
objective in health. A balance needs to be aimed at especially for the sake of the poor.  
 
One of the crucial points to take note of in this work is consideration of how the major moral 
principles of allocation of health resources and QALY analysis of health policy ignore the 
fundamental source of inequity in health. From the analysis, it has been realised that due to 
severe shortages of health care resources in Uganda what occupies most health care 
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professionals and researchers is how to increase funding for the sector and achieve efficiency 
– according to most reports and recommendations made by the sector. Hence, this shows that 
when funding is so severely constrained, it is tempting to pay more attention to how to 
increase funding, maximise health benefits and save money, and this leads to relegating 
concerns of how equitably these resources are raised and allocated. But it should be noted that 
the concerns of equity in health are necessitated by the fact of scarcity of resources. Hence, 
scarcity in this case should be taken as a constant and then pursue equity nevertheless.10 So, 
scarcity of resources should not divert attention from concerns of equity but instead make 
equity concerns take a centre stage in health care discourse since it is then that very stringent 
choices regarding health care rationing have to be made.  
 
It has been shown that Uganda is so severely deprived in terms of health entitlement and this 
is due to very insufficient funding to the sector. This situation of insufficient funding has had 
a number of implications especially on the financing mechanisms of health services in 
particular for the poor. The first implication is that the health sector can not afford to finance 
what it regards as the minimum health care for the population. The second is that there is a lot 
of reliance on the private sector and out-of-pocket payments for health services. This has 
made equity even harder to achieve in health since the poor are being extremely more pressed 
than the rich. Further, from the critical analysis of the QALY approach – the widely used 
criterion for rationing health resources - and the substantive ethical principles, it has been 
shown that there is nothing inherently morally wrong with health benefit maximisation. 
However, this being the case does not mean that it should be done at the expense of fairness 
with which these benefits are distributed. Concerns of equity should be used to mitigate 
QALY’s extremism. Finally, given the strong determination between poverty and ill-health 
                                                 
10
 Justice in health is not about meeting all health needs of the population. Rather, it is about equitable sharing of 
the burdens and benefits of the health system – namely, how to equitably raise and distribute health resources. 
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with the consequent negative implications for equity in health against the poor, it is not 
enough, for the sake of achieving equity in Uganda, to stop at attempting to fairly and 
efficiently allocate resources at the public sector’s disposal. Instead, for the sake of the poor, 
revolutionary financing mechanism for the health sector which is pro-poor needs to be 
developed. These financing strategies should be equitable in a sense that they involve 
progressive financing and cross-subsidisation. Hence, for the case of Uganda, it is necessary 
to focus on the needs of the financially poor because they are disproportionately adversely 
affected in the current system, by spending a large proportion of their income on health. 
Therefore, developing an equitable financing mechanism for the health care system which 
takes into consideration the special needs of the poor should be a key priority in Uganda. 
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